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I. INTRODUCTION 
On Saturday, April27, 2013, The Center for Inquiry Institute held a 
symposium in Washington, D.C. on the topic, Why Tolerate 
Religion?' The topic was a reference to Brian Leiter's 2013 book by 
the same title.2 This symposium was something of a coming out 
party culturally for a debate that had been ongoing in the legal 
academy for some time-the debate often denominated, is religion 
specia/?3 The Center for Inquiry Institute is an important institution 
in the growing secular cohort of American society. The holding of 
this symposium meant that the challenge to the uniqueness of religion 
*Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. This paper was prepared 
with support from the Duquesne Summer Research Writing Program. My thanks to 
my research assistants, Kevin Lorello and Kyle Thomas, for their assistance during 
the preparation of this article. 
I. Center for Inquiry Symposium: Why Tolerate Religion? (Apr. 27, 2013) [hereinafter 
CFI Symposium] (symposium program may be viewed at 
http://action.centerforinquiry .net/site/Calendar?id= 1 0330 1 &view= Detail). 
2. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013). 
3. See Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 303, 319 (200 1 ). 
1 
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in America would move from academic discussion to political and 
social struggle. 
On one level, the question raised at the symposium was one of 
fairness. Why should religious believers receive exemption from 
generally applicable laws that impinge on religious practice and 
belief when nonbelievers would not receive the same protection in 
similar circumstances? This is how the fairness issue was framed in 
information about the symposium: 
Should a corporation operated by religious believers 
be exempt from a federal rule mandating contraceptive 
coverage for employees, while an organization run by 
nonreligious persons is not? Should an employee who 
objects to performing certain tasks on the basis of their 
religion be accommodated, while objections by a 
nonreligious employee are ignored? Should a 
religious organization receiving government funding 
be allowed to hire only adherents of their particular 
worldview, while a secularist organization cannot do 
the same?4 
It might be imagined that the point of this fairness issue is to 
expand exemptions for conscience so that persons not affiliated with 
organized religion would be protected. As the cases litigating 
possible religious exemption from the contraception mandate in the 
Affordable Care Act go forward,5 such an expansion of exemptions 
from religion specifically to conscience generally could change the 
current political landscape. It might help create new political 
coalitions between religious believers and nonbelievers. 
But this impression that the issue is that of expanding exemptions 
would be mistaken. As the information about the symposium went 
on to make clear, the end result, and perhaps the goal, of raising the 
fairness issue is actually to restrict all conscience exemptions, 
including religious ones, in American law. 
Leiter contends that the reasons for tolerating religion are not 
specific to religion, and instead apply to all claims of conscience-
and that governments are not required to grant exemptions 
4. See CFI Symposium, supra note 1. 
5. According to The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, as of Summer 2013, there are 
over sixty-seven cases and over two hundred plaintiffs challenging the contraception 
mandate in one form or another. HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET 
FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last 
visited Dec. 20, 20 13). 
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of any kind, religious or otherwise, from laws that promote the 
general welfare.6 
This restriction on exemptions from generally applicable laws, 
which would be viewed by many religious believers as an assault on 
religious liberty disguised as a protection for secular conscience, 
would come as no surprise to participants in the ongoing is religion 
special? debate.7 That debate has assumed on both sides that religion 
will continue to enjoy protection in public policy and in law as 
religion only if religion is regarded as special.8 The two sides in this 
debate have shared the starting point that religion is unique and can 
be distinguished from philosophical or other deep secular 
commitments. The two sides differ not as to whether religion is 
unique, but as to whether religion is ·especially valuable when 
compared to other forms of conscience.9 
This paper aims to change the terms of this debate about religion. I 
agree with Leiter that religion understood in some formal and 
organizational sense is not special compared to other forms of 
conscientious commitment, that is, not especially valuable. But I 
disagree both with Leiter and most of the participants in this debate, 
on both sides, that religion is unique. Religion cannot be 
distinguished from certain forms of philosophical or other deep 
commitments practiced by persons who are not members of 
organized religion and who may not consider themselves to be 
religious. No attempt to distinguish conscientious believers and 
conscientious nonbelievers should be made. 
The effect of this change from understanding religion as unique to 
seeing religious conscience and nonreligious conscience as one 
continuum would be to expand the reach of religious exemptions in 
law rather than to subsume religious exemptions into conscience 
exemption clauses. But this expansion would not have the effect of 
negating the effectiveness of such clauses. In other words, the 
expansion in exemptions that I propose would not be so vast as to 
require that there be no, or almost no, exemptions at all from 
generally applicable laws. The model for this expansion in 
interpreting religious exemptions is the Vietnam era draft cases, in 
6. LEITER, supra note 2, at 101. 
7. See Rutherford, supra note 3, at 319. 
8. See id. at 323. 
9. See Chad Flanders, The Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REv. 257,293 (2008). 
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which nonreligious conscience was treated by the Supreme Court as 
basically identical to religious conscience.10 
Because the equal value of religious conscience and nonreligious 
conscience becomes, in Leiter's treatment, a reason for restricting the 
reach of exemptions from generally applicable laws, and because this 
restriction applies primarily to traditionally religious claims, I call his 
position the Anti-Religion Equality Project. And, for opposite 
reasons, I call my position the Pro-Religion Equality Project, since I 
propose retaining traditional protections for religious belief and 
practice and expanding them to beliefs that are not traditionally 
considered religious. 
The article proceeds in Part I to set forth Leiter's position, in Part 
II, to place his argument within the context of the ongoing debate in 
American law and society over the special place of religion, and in 
Part III, to evaluate Leiter's project. In my view, Leiter fails to 
defme religion convincingly, but, surprisingly, I also conclude that 
this failure is not central to his position. This conclusion leads me, in 
Part IV to propose the Pro-Religion Equality Project. Part V 
describes the Vietnam War draft cases, United States v. Seeger, 11 
Welsh v. United States, 12 and Gillette v. United States13 as illustrative 
of the Pro-Religion Equality Project in practice. In Part VI, I explore 
the difficulties that arise from conscience clauses in the context of 
exemptions from mandatory vaccination laws and suggest that the 
expansion of religious exemptions in that context would be a much 
better policy. In Part VII, I set forth some objections to the 
expansion of religious exemptions as an alternative to conscience 
clauses. Part VIII explores the implications of the Pro-Religion 
Equality Project for healing some of our divisions over religion and 
nonbelief. Finally, my conclusion suggests that the easy assumption 
of secularity that nonbelievers make may mask the difficult task of 
creating a flourishing secular civilization, including a role for serious 
spiritual seeking in secularism. 
As will become clear, this article does not really aim at solving the 
legal problem of the proper interpretation of religious exemption 
provisions. This article does not even discuss the difference between 
religious exemptions that are absolute, as in the draft cases, and the 
balancing tests in free exercise and religious liberty statutory 
exemption challenges, such as that of the Religious Freedom 
10. See infra Part V. 
II. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
12. 398 u.s. 333 (1970). 
13. 401 u.s. 437 (1971). 
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Restoration Act (RFRA). 14 Rather, my concern is the growing divide 
in America between believers and nonbelievers. It is my hope that 
the recognition that those who practice traditional religions share 
similar beliefs with many of those who do not, will lead to 
reconciliation and a reduction in the enmity that currently 
characterizes American life. 
II. WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 
The argument in Leiter's book is made in simple and 
straightforward fashion. The main point Leiter argues is that there is 
no "credible principled argument for tolerating religion qua religion . 
• • • "
15 In Chapter 1, Leiter sets forth the moral and ep1stemic cases 
for principled toleration, primarily by the state, of private choices and 
conscientious commitments in general in the absence of harm to 
others or a threat to social order. 16 These arguments are, and are 
meant to be seen as, philosophically traditional. 17 The moral 
arguments are said to be typically Kantian or utilitarian. 18 The moral 
arguments "claim either that there is a right to the liberty to hold the 
beliefs and engage in the practices of which toleration is required; or 
that toleration of those beliefs and practices is essential to the 
realization of morally important goods."19 The epistemic arguments 
for toleration emphasize, instead, "the contribution that tolerance 
makes to knowledge."20 
The reader should note that principled toleration for Leiter does not 
demand very much of the state. The state may not suppress 
conscientious beliefs and may not select conscientious practices in 
particular for legal sanction, but that essentially exhausts the state's 
obligation.21 The limits on toleration, which Leiter refers to as side-
constraints,22 and which he asserts impact mostly on conscientious 
practices rather than beliefs, include preventing damage to the public 
order and other forms ofharm.23 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
15. LEITER, supra note 2, at 7. 
16. See id. at 7-8, 10, 15. 
17. See id. at 8, 10. 
18. See id. at 15. 
19. /d. 
20. /d. at 19. 
21. See id. at 63. 
22. !d. at 21. 
23. See id. at 22-23. 
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Leiter does not expressly defme what he means by conscientious 
commitments, either in Chapter 1 or anywhere else in the book. He 
suggests at one point, however, a very broad understanding of 
conscience as "being able to choose what to believe and how to 
live."24 Later in the book, conscience will be described as something 
narrower, as something much more serious and imperative?5 
Since Leiter is going to argue that religious conscience as a 
category does not deserve any greater legal protection or social 
acknowledgment than secular conscience, he sees it as necessary, in 
Chapter 2, to define religion as a unique realm. 26 Referring to the 
work of John Witte, Leiter denies that religion is a unique source of 
individual and personal identity.27 But he agrees with Witte that the 
concept of owing a duty to our Creator, while not literally present in 
every religion, does distinguish religion in terms of the "normativity 
of (at least some) religious commands .... "28 Drawing on the work 
of Timothy Macklem, Leiter states that religious belief is based on 
faith rather than reason.29 
Leiter concludes from these sources that for all religions, there are 
at least some central beliefs: 
1. issue in categorical demands on action-that is, 
demands that must be satisfied no matter what an 
individual's antecedent desires and no matter what 
incentives or disincentives the world offers up; and 
2. do not answer ultimately (or at the limit) to 
evidence and reasons, as these are understood in other 
domains concerned with knowledge of the world. 
Religious beliefs, in virtue ofbeing based on "faith," 
are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and 
rational justification, the ones we employ use both 
common sense and science.30 
Leiter then proceeds in Chapter 2 to test out these two criteria in 
terms of possible under inclusiveness and over inclusiveness.31 In 
24. /d. at 17-18. 
25. !d. at 95; see infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. 
26. LEITER, supra note 2, at 4-7, 31-35. 
27. /d. at 32-33. 
28. /d. at 33. 
29. !d. at 31. 
30. /d. at 33-34. 
31. /d. at 46. 
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terms of under inclusiveness, Leiter is asking whether any traditions 
generally regarded as religious are excluded by his definitions.32 
Leiter concludes that both Buddhism and certain "intellectualist" 
strains of Christianity, though purporting to be based on reason, still 
fit his definition of religion.33 In terms of over inclusiveness, Leiter 
concludes that Marxism and morality in general, though clearly 
issuing in categorical demands, are not insulated from evidence and 
reason in the same sense as is religion.34 In the course of this 
discussion, Leiter discards a possible third criterion of religion-that 
it "involve, explicitly or implicitly, a metaphysics of ultimate 
reality."35 This quality, Leiter believes, is already captured by 
religion's insulation from evidence.36 In order to distinguish religion 
more sharply from morality, however, Leiter adds another distinction: 
that there are some beliefs in religion that "render intelligible and 
tolerable the basic existential facts about human life, such as 
suffering and death.'m 
Having now defmed religion and religious belief, Leiter proceeds 
in Chapter 3 to ask whether religion, understood in this way, deserves 
special protection in law and special acknowledgment from society.38 
His answer is no because, in terms of moral reasons, there is no 
greater right to religious conscience than to any other form of 
conscience (we would not distinguish religious conscience from 
liberty of conscience in Rawls's original position, for example), and 
because religious beliefs, since they are insulated from reason and 
evidence, are not any more likely to give us knowledge than 
conscientious beliefs of any other kind.39 Of course, religious beliefs 
and practices deserve toleration, but that is because they involve 
matters of conscience, not because they involve matters of religion.40 
At this point in Chapter 3, Leiter explores a concrete case of 
claimed religious exemption from generally applicable law.41 The 
concrete instance is one of a male believer in the Sikh religion who 
must wear a ceremonial dagger or sword and who runs afoul of a law 
32. See id. at 42. 
33. I d. at 40, 45-46. 
34. Id. at 38, 49-50. 
35. Id. at 47. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 52. 
38. Id. at61. 
39. Id. at 63. 
40. Id. at 64. 
41. I d. 
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banning weapons in public schools.42 Leiter begins his book with a 
contrast between this fourteen-year-old Sikh boy and a boy from a 
rural family whose family tradition entails the passing of a dagger or 
knife from father to son across the generations.43 In the Introduction, 
the contrast of the two instances is meant to raise the question of 
religious exemptions from general law versus nonreligious 
exemptions from generallaw.44 
But in Chapter 3, Leiter raises the issue of the religious exemption 
for a different purpose. Here the point is that an exemption of any 
kind from a generally applicable law should not be granted if it 
causes harm to others.45 Leiter criticizes the Canadian Supreme 
Court case that permitted the Sikh child to carry the ceremonial 
knife.46 In Leiter's view, the school setting should not have been 
distinguished from the contexts of courtrooms and airplanes, where 
no accommodations for ceremonial weapons are permitted.47 
This discussion in Chapter 3 illustrates an ambiguity that afflicts 
the entire book. As explained above, principled toleration for Leiter 
is always limited by the harm principle.48 This has nothing to do with 
exemptions, religious or otherwise, from generally applicable laws. 
If toleration is not demanded because a particular religious practice 
threatens harm, then not only should there be no exemption for such a 
practice, but the practice itself should be banned. For example, 
religious human sacrifice could be specifically banned, along with 
homicide in general, on the theory that if there is a religion widely 
practiced that encourages human sacrifice, countering that 
encouragement would justify banning human sacrifice per se.49 
It should follow then that if there is a law banning some particular 
act as dangerous in general, such as a ban on weapons in school, 
toleration would never require, or even permit, a religious or 
conscience exemption from that law. For such an exemption would 
by definition run afoul of the harm principle. 
The ambiguity lies in the fact that Leiter never explains the level of 
generality at which the harm principle operates. Clearly, laws 
banning weapons in school are justified by the harm principle and 
42. !d. 
43. !d. at 1-2. 
44. See id. at 3. 
45. See id. at 62--63. 
46. !d. at 64--65 (criticizing Mu1tani v. Comm'n sco1aire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 
S.C.R. 256 (Can.)). 
47. !d. at 65. 
48. See id. at 21-23, 62--69. 
49. See id. at 66. This is my example rather than Leiter's, but it follows from his views. 
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serve the common good. But, just as clearly, practitioners of the Sikh 
religion who have ceremonial daggers pose no real threat at all to 
public order. So, aside from the concern about a child who only 
claims to be a sincere devotee of the Sikh religion, or aside from the 
highly unlikely event that a Sikh schoolchild becomes deranged, 
there is no way to decide whether the harm principle prohibits an 
exemption to the no weapons policy or not. But Leiter condemns the 
exemption without resolving how these judgments should be made, 
or even which party, the believer or the state, should have the burden 
of proof that no danger ofharm is present in this one instance.50 
In Chapter 4, Leiter rejects the argument by Martha Nussbaum, 
who undoubtedly speaks for many in her book Liberty of 
Conscience,51 that religion is entitled to more than mere toleration-
that religion is entitled to respect.52 Leiter argues that religion is 
entitled to minimal respect, but not to any affirmative concept of 
respect, and that minimal respect is not much different from 
religion's right to toleration.53 Leiter concludes that since religion is 
insulated from ordinary standards of reason and evidence, religion is 
culpable false belief: that is, religious believers hold beliefs that are 
unwarranted and which they ought to know are unwarranted. 54 
Efforts by apologists for religion, such as William Alston and Alvin 
Plantinga, to show that religion is rational are simply efforts to justify 
insulation of religious faith from ordinary standards of reason and 
evidence in common sense and the sciences.55 
Not only are religious beliefs likely to be false, but since they are 
also often issue in categorical demands, we can assume that they are 
especially likely to cause harm to others. Leiter admits that religious 
belief has often also led to impressive defenses of human rights when 
most others have been silent.56 Nevertheless, the track record of 
religion is too mixed to rely on this occasional heroic phenomenon. 
50. See id. at 110-15. Perhaps it will prove to be the case, for example, that any 
exemption will raise impossible proof issues or will be impossible to limit 
appropriately. But these problems must be shown, which is what I refer to as the 
burden of proof that Leiter ignores. 
51. !d. at 68; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008). 
52. LEITER, supra note 2, at 68. 
53. Id. at 69. 
54. See id. at 77-81. 
55. /d. at 81. 
56. E.g., id. at 36. 
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Nor does Leiter agree with John Finnis that religion contains more 
truth about reality than can any atheism. 57 Finnis is referring to the 
Thomist concept of the norm of rationality-that there is a reason 
beyond chance or necessity why things are as they are-which, 
Finnis argues, guides all rational inquiry, including that of science.58 
Leiter denies that an "explanatory reason," in the sense of such 
causation or telos, is essential to rational inquiry.59 Thus, religion, 
like any realm of conscience, is entitled to toleration but not to 
respect. 
In Chapter 5, entitled broadly The Law of Religious Liberty in a 
Tolerant Society, Leiter attempts to provide a big picture of the 
proper overall treatment of religious liberty in a liberal society.60 But 
it quickly becomes apparent that Leiter will not actually develop any 
broad approach that would set forth standards for when exemptions 
for conscience, religious and secular, from neutral laws should be 
granted. 
Instead, it turns out that Leiter's concern is to bring a prior 
inconsistency into alignment.61 Leiter believes that he has shown that 
liberty of conscience should be protected "under the rubric of 
principled toleration."62 He believes that he has also shown that there 
is no principled reason to grant religious conscience any greater legal 
protection than nonreligious conscience.63 The problem Leiter 
focuses on is that, on the one hand, "liberty of conscience generally is 
morally important," but under "extant law" religious liberty is treated 
as more important than liberty of conscience generally-in America 
in a de jure fashion and in every other Western democracy in a de 
facto fashion. 64 Leiter believes that his proposed adjustment in the 
balance of religious and nonreligious conscience will play out over 
the issue of exemptions from generally applicable laws.65 
Of course, by this formulation the reader has no way to know 
whether Leiter believes that religious liberty is now receiving the 
theoretically proper level of protection and other forms of conscience 
simply need to be protected to a greater extent, or whether Leiter 
57. /d. at 86-87. 
58. /d. at 87-88. 
59. See id. at 88-89. 
60. See id. at 92-133 (arguing that liberal societies should not grant religious 
exemptions). 
61. See id. at 93, 132-33. 
62. !d. at 92. 
63. !d. at 92-93. 
64. /d. 
65. /d. at 93. 
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believes that the protection of religious liberty is too strong and needs 
to be reduced, or whether some combination of increase and 
reduction will be Leiter's goal. 
Because he is not really designing a general regime of liberty, 
Leiter never specifies the attributes of conscience that might justify 
an exemption from a generally applicable law. The two examples of 
conscience claims that Leiter previously set forth-that of the Sikh 
boy under whose tradition a ceremonial knife must be carried into 
school and the rural boy whose familial traditions entail a similar 
demand66--describe well-established practices. The reader might 
conclude, therefore, that conscience, to be recognized, must be 
objectively identifiable by some kind of communal custom. Leiter 
quickly excludes that possibility by including the example of the 
"lone eccentric, who for reasons known only to him, feels a 
categorical compulsion, with which he deeply identifies as a matter 
of personal integrity, to always have a knife nearby . . . ."67 
Conscience, for Leiter, is potentially an individual matter.68 He notes 
that perhaps Thoreau was such a lone eccentric.69 
Leiter's hostility toward conscience exemptions only becomes 
apparent when he begins his discussion of liberty of conscience with 
an echo of Justice Scalia's position in Employment Division v. 
Smith10-that to recognize a universal exemption for conscience 
would "appear to amount to a legalization of anarchy!"71 He first 
addresses the evidentiary problem in evaluating claims of 
conscience.72 Leiter asserts now, for the first time, that a valid claim 
of conscience must be "a kind of moral imperative central to one's 
integrity as a person, to the meaning of one's life."73 Therefore, a 
66. !d. at 1-2. 
67. !d. at 93. 
68. See id. at 95. 
69. !d. at 160 n.l. 
70. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by 
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). 
71. LEITER, supra note 2, at 94. The exclamation point belongs to Leiter and he does not 
refer to Justice Scalia's opinion that "[a]ny society adopting such a system would be 
courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's 
diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of 
them." Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. Justice Scalia, in context, was criticizing a robust 
application of the compelling state interest test to claims of religious exemption, 
which is similar to the objection Leiter is raising. 
72. LEITER, supra note 2, at 94. 
73. !d. at 95. 
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legal system must have a way to distinguish claims of conscience 
from other sorts of objections to law, such as self-interest.74 Leiter 
admits that limiting conscience exemptions to the category of religion 
grants an evidentiary advantage in this regard because a religious 
claimant must at least reference a religion. 75 
One way to deal with this evidentiary problem might be to limit 
claims of conscience to communal traditions that mimic the practices 
of religious groups. The example that Leiter gives is the "vegan 
prisoner" who is a member of the "animal liberation movement. "76 
Leiter concludes that the problem with this kind of compromise is 
that it treats different kinds of claims of conscience unequally in a 
context in which the unequal treatment is not justified except by 
pragmatic reasons of proof.77 
Leiter at this point introduces an objection to universal exemptions 
for conscience that he believes goes beyond evidentiary problems and 
even equality problems.78 Exemptions from generally applicable 
laws often impose burdens on others, whether these others are ones 
who must take up the slack, as in the case of conscientious objection 
to military duty, or are ones who must deal with the consequences of 
the objection, as in the taxpayers and kitchen staff who must deal 
with food exemptions in prison. 79 
Leiter states that, in a circumstance in which general compliance 
with laws is necessary to promote the "common good," any scheme 
of exemptions from those laws is "morally objectionable."80 Leiter 
gives examples of laws that promote the general welfare and thus for 
him ground a moral objection to any exemptions: zoning regulations, 
mandatory vaccination laws and a weapons ban in schools. 81 And he 
gives examples of exemptions that he says do not necessarily raise 
this moral objection: the right to wear religious clothing and to use 
certain illegal narcotics in religious rituals. 82 
Despite Leiter's statements to the contrary, Leiter is not 
distinguishing here among different kinds of laws. All of these laws 
promote the common good. Rather, he is distinguishing among 
exemptions from law based on which exemptions impose burdens on 
74. !d. 
75. !d. 
76. !d. at 96-97. 
77. See id. at 98. 
78. !d. at 98-99. 
79. !d. at 99. 
80. !d. 
81. !d. at 99-100. 
82. !d. at 100. 
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others. Placing a burden on others seems to be what he means by the 
moral objection to a universal scheme of exemptions from law. But 
it is not clear why and in what sense an exemption from a zoning 
regulation always imposes such a burden on others, while an 
exemption for drug use never does. 
Leiter then suggests, as a potential rule, that there be no exemptions 
from generally applicable laws, "except when no burden-shifting is 
involved."83 Again, Leiter has not explained why there should ever 
be exemptions from laws that serve the general welfare, even when 
there is no burden shifting involved. He states in a footnote that one 
reason to accept exemptions at all is a kind of moral realism about 
rights, which as a "moral skeptic" he does not share.84 Leiter admits 
that he cannot be certain that the majority's vision of morality is more 
reliable than that of the individual conscience objector.85 This seems 
to me to be a crucial problem for him, but at this point Leiter simply 
stops. 86 The discussion in the book just goes back and forth, without 
explanation, from a proposed regime of no exemptions unless there 
are no burdens to others to a regime of no exemptions at all.87 
Leiter acknowledges that a rule of no exemptions in practice will 
burden minority claims of conscience, religious or otherwise, since 
laws enacted by the majority will presumably not impinge on 
mainstream conscientious objection.88 Leiter also admits that some 
religious practices, such as charitable activities, are entitled to more 
than mere toleration, and thus, may be granted exemptions from 
certain laws, such as is the case with tax exempt organizations.89 But 
religious conscience in general is entitled only to toleration. 
Leiter reminds the reader that while a rule of no exemptions from 
laws that promote the general welfare is justified under principled 
toleration, state hostility to religious practices per se violates 
83. /d. at 101. 
84. /d. at 163 n.12. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 103-04 (referencing a regime of "no exemptions for burden-shifting claims 
of conscience"). 
88. /d. at 101-Q2. The experience of the Affordable Care Act litigation gives pause here 
since the objectors to the contraception mandate include very mainstream Roman 
Catholic and other Christian objectors. Perhaps we are entering a time in which the 
logic of the culture wars will drive secular policymakers increasingly to challenge 
traditional religious positions. This may prove to be the case with the legalization of 
gay marriage, as another example. 
89. /d. at 103. 
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principled toleration.90 In Leiter's view, the French ban on religious 
clothing in public schools is an instance of intolerance rather than an 
instance of the rule of no exemptions.91 The difference between the 
two is not just that the French ban seems to be motivated by anti-
Islamic bias.92 That kind of forbidden animus could, in principle, be 
proved and religious practitioners protected by the courts.93 The 
reason that the French ban on headscarves is intolerant is that any 
claim of harm from such religious clothing is speculative and 
unlikely to be empirically vindicated.94 After all, the harm claimed in 
defense of the ban is not the risk of physical assault or other forms of 
harassment, but only the promotion of the "moral ideal of equal 
citizenship. "95 
It is not obvious why the threat to this moral ideal posed by 
religious garb in public schools is not a real harm that the French are 
entitled to prohibit under principled toleration. It is clear that Leiter 
wishes to distinguish laws that are in some way aimed against 
practices of conscience from laws with neutral objectives.96 The 
former laws are generally unjustified. The latter laws are not only 
justified themselves, they are justified even if they do not provide 
exemptions for conscience. The difference between the two has to do 
with the kinds of goods that the state may legitimately promote. 
Leiter takes strong exception to the Rawlsian view that the state 
may not endorse a substantive vision of the good.97 Leiter considers 
such endorsement not only proper but inevitable by any state.98 But 
there are no visions of the good that are acceptable to everyone. 
Undoubtedly, such state endorsement is in a sense a burden on the 
consciences of the dissenters, but the dissenters have no moral claim 
to exemption from laws expressing the state's vision of the good. 
The closest that Leiter comes to enunciating a general statement 
about the role of conscience, including religion, in terms of the goods 
pursued in a liberal state is that, consistent with principled toleration, 
the state may endorse a conception of the good that conflicts with the 
claims of conscience of some of its citizens as long as its objective is 
90. !d. at 103-04. 
91. /d. at 104-05. 
92. /d. at 105-07. 
93. See id. at 107. 
94. /d. at 114. 
95. !d. at 113. 
96. !d. at 114. 
97. !d. at 108. 
98. See id. at II 7. 
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not to suppress or coercively burden those claims of conscience, but 
to serve the state's conception of the good.99 
Leiter must walk a fine line here. In his view, principled toleration 
is equally compatible with an established church or with 
disestablishment. 100 Within the context of disestablishment, Leiter 
believes that religious concerns may properly be banished from some 
contexts in the public square, such as public schools. 101 Leiter argues 
that the Supreme Court is mistaken in prohibiting public schools from 
barring use of public facilities by religious groups. 102 
The seeming inconsistency here is that the state's conception of the 
good might even include a view of religion as mythology-a false 
claim versus the scientific claims of evolution and geology. At first 
glance, that would seem to be the situation in France. Where the 
French went too far, according to Leiter, was in banning religious 
expression where there was no realistic threat to the state conception 
of the good as secular. 103 No threat, that is, beyond the legitimate 
expression of a "different Vision of the Good."104 But, of course, this 
is conclusory. It could just as easily be asserted that the use of public 
facilities by religious groups poses no realistic threat of harm either. 
Finally, Leiter mentions and dismisses the ground of religious 
exemptions from law premised on likely resistance by religious 
believers. 105 Leiter concedes that the majority's laws may be unjust. 
Religious believers, or other claimants of conscience, may be correct 
to resist unjust laws. 106 Such considerations are separate, however, 
from the moral justifications of exemptions from the general 
requirements of law. 
I have described Leiter's position at length because I will rely later 
in this article on the reader's understanding of distinctions that I will 
draw with regard to Leiter's views. But Leiter's arguments did not 
arise in a vacuum. The context is necessary for a full evaluation of 
his position. 
99. /d. 
100. /d. at 117-18. 
101. !d. at 120-21. 
102. !d. at 123. 
103. !d. at 121. 
104. /d. at 119. 
105. !d. at 131-32. 
106. !d. at 132-33. 
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III. THE ANTI-RELIGION EQUALITY PROJECT IN CONTEXT 
Leiter is arguing two separate propositions. First, he is arguing that 
religious conscience is equivalent to nonreligious conscience in terms 
of its value, both to the individual's conscience and to society in 
some more general sense. 107 Thus, religion is not special. The 
implication of this first position is that instances of nonreligious 
conscience deserve the same level of legal protection as instances of 
religious conscience. I call this aspect of Leiter's position, the 
Equality Project, because it places religious and nonreligious 
conscience in a position of equality. There is no way to tell a priori 
whether conscience receives a great deal of legal protection or very 
little. 
Leiter's second proposition concerns the ultimate level of 
protection any form of conscience should receive. The level of 
protection that Leiter proposes is based on the principle of toleration, 
which, since it prohibits any form of discrimination or coercion 
aimed at conscience per se, would yield a high level of protection in 
the context of a government hostile toward religion. 108 This is the 
lesson of Leiter's condemnation of the French ban on headscarves in 
public schools. 109 
But in the context of a liberal regime protective generally of, or at 
least not hostile to, liberty of conscience and religion, toleration 
promises very little, since it does not require exemption from any 
neutral law of general applicability. In practice, therefore, Leiter's 
scheme perfectly replicates the balance of Employment Division v. 
Smith 110 and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 111 
which, respectively, hold that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
require a religious exemption from any neutral, generally applicable 
law, but that the clause does usually prohibit discrimination against 
religion. 112 
In the context of such a limited degree of legal protection for 
conscience in general, the net effect of Leiter's position, if it were 
adopted, would be to reduce the level of legal protection that exists 
today for religious conscience under either state constitutions, or 
107. !d. at 133. 
108. See id. at 105. 
109. See id. at 104--06. 
110. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by 
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). 
111. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave., Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
112. See id. at 529-30; Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-83. 
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federal and state religious exemption statutes.113 That is why I refer 
to the equality proposed by Leiter as one that is anti-religion. Thus, I 
call his position overall the Anti-Religion Equality Project. 
The debate over Leiter's own Anti-Religion Equality Project has 
been going on for quite some time. Leiter originally set forth his 
position in a 2008 law review article. 114 Apparently, however, the 
paper upon which that article was based had been circulating among 
legal academics much earlier than that. 115 
But if we think of the context not just in terms of Leiter's specific 
arguments, but in terms of the general acceptance and honor that used 
to be accorded to religion, the debate over the value of religion has 
been growing for quite some time in American legal circles.116 Prior 
to Smith in 1990, the subject of hostility to religion mostly came up in 
law review literature as the question about whether a particular 
ruling, or rulings, by the Supreme Court manifested a forbidden 
hostility toward religion in the context of interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause.117 Thus, in 1989, Mark Tushnet had difficulty 
taking seriously Kent Greenawalt's concern about "[a] good many 
professors and other intellectuals [who] display a hostility or 
skeptical indifference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised 
contempt for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by 
scientific inquiry and ordinary human experience."118 Tushnet 
responded, "There may of course be adamant strict separationists 
113. See Bruce Ledewitz, Experimenting with Religious Liberty: The Quasi-Constitutional 
Status of Religious Exemptions, ELON L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 53-
54) (providing a general treatment of the national context for religious exemptions). 
114. See generally Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2008) 
(setting forth Leiter's fundamental position). The gist of chapter four was published 
later, in Brian Leiter, Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 935, 937-38 (2010). 
115. See Richard W. Garnett & Joshua D. Dunlap, Taking Accommodation Seriously: 
Religious Freedom and the 0 Centro Case, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 257, 279-80 
(2006). 
116. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 76-77 (2007) (arguing for "equal liberty" for religious and 
nonreligious commitments). 
117. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Separation and the 'Secular': Reconstructing the 
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REv. 955, 958 n.l7 (1989) ("Although I am 
unaware of any reputable scholar or judge who has argued that the [E]stablishment 
[C]lause requires government to be actively hostile to religion, many scholars have 
argued that current establishment doctrine is in fact hostile to religion in its 
consequences, and perhaps in its inspiration."). 
118. Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1131, 1134 (1989)(reviewing 
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988)). 
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who would invalidate all laws that rested in some significant way on 
religious motivations. To the extent that such people are intolerant of 
those who simply hold religious views, they need not be taken 
seriously."119 Donald McConnell refers to this period as "a defacto 
settlement of the balance between religious liberty and secular liberal 
public policy."120 In other words, there was a general pro-religion 
consensus during this period. 
Smith came as something of a shock to this context. The case was 
criticized as hostile to free exercise values. 121 The immediate 
response to Smith was a debate over returning to a preexisting norm 
that was perceived as not having been hostile toward religion. 122 
The situation today in the legal academy is very different. Paul 
Horwitz describes what has happened as the collapse of a fragile 
consensus. 123 The difference is certainly related, as Horwitz argues, 
to larger cultural forces such as the New Atheism and to a resurgence 
of the demands of religious believers to be heard in the public 
square. 124 I will return to that larger, cultural context in a moment. 
But if I had to name a single event that crystalized latent 
ambivalence, if not hostility, toward religion in the legal academy, it 
would be the scandal of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church. 125 The 
most ardent expression of that hostility, revolutionary at the time in 
its candor, was Marci Hamilton's 2005 book, God vs. the Gave/. 126 
After the publication of Hamilton's book, it became acceptable for 
American legal academics to express skepticism about the beneficent 
role of religion. Religion was no longer special, at least not for 
everyone. 
Once the gloves were off, so to speak, the ground was prepared for 
Leiter's question, Why Tolerate Religion? And, of course, there are 
119. !d. at 1135. 
120. Donald R. McConnell, Is Modern Legal Liberalism Still Compatible with Free 
Exercise of Religion?, 33 CAMPBELL L. REv. 641, 643 (2011). 
121. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. 
REv. 671,681-82,687-91 (1992). 
122. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the 
Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 
181, 183-88 (1992). 
123. PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 3-4 
(2011). 
124. !d. at 22-30. 
125. For a description of the scandal and the early response of the Church, see NICHOLAS P. 
CAFARO!, BEFORE DALLAS: THE U.S. BISHOPS' RESPONSE TO CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 
OF CHILDREN (2008). 
126. MARCIA. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 5-6 
(2005). 
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religious 127 and nonreligious128 defenses ofthe uniqueness of religious 
liberty in response to Leiter. 
In terms of the cultural forces that Horwitz describes, one can see 
the growing divide between believers and nonbelievers, certainly 
since the beginning of the twenty-first century. 129 One obvious 
starting point is the New Atheist attack on religion that gained 
momentum during the early years of the twenty-first century.130 That 
loose movement of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, 
and Christopher Hitchens, among others, raised no new arguments 
against God's existence, but did set the stage for the emergence of a 
mass anti-religious movement for the first time in America. 131 The 
culmination of the New Atheist movement was Hitchens' best-seller, 
God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, originally 
published in 2007. 132 That book made clear that the object of attack 
by the New Atheism was religion in general and not just belief in 
God per se. 133 Shortly before his death in 2011, Hitchens expressed 
this view in an interview in The New Statesman with Richard 
Dawkins: 
The totalitarian, to me, is the enemy - the one that's 
absolute, the one that wants control over the inside of your 
head, not just your actions and your taxes. And the 
origins of that are theocratic, obviously. The beginning of 
that is the idea that there is a supreme leader, or infallible 
127. See, e.g., E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 
114 PENN ST. L. REv. 485, 491 (2009) ("My thesis is that the First Amendment's 
protection of religious freedom must rest preeminently on the intrinsic character and 
claims of religion itself. Religion requires special constitutional treatment precisely 
because it involves something transcendent, objective, normative, and exclusive."). 
128. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REv. 407, 430 (2011). 
129. HORWITZ, supra note 123, at xiii-xviii. 
130. !d. at xiii-xiv. 
131. For general critical accounts of this rise, see TINA BEATTIE, THE NEW ATHEISTS: THE 
TWILIGHT OF REASON AND THE WAR ON RELIGION (2007) and JOHN F. HAUGHT, GOD 
AND THE NEW ATHEISM: A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO DAWKINS, HARRIS AND HITCHENS 
(2008). 
132. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING 
(2007). 
133. See id. at 17. 
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pope, or a chief rabbi, or whatever, who can ventriloquise 
the divine and tell us what to do.134 
God is just the chief totalitarian, among other totalitarians. 
[Vol. 43 
This criticism of religious faith as unthinking was the theme of 
another cultural marker of the growing distance between believers 
and nonbelievers-the Reason Rally held on March 24, 2012 in 
Washington D.C. 135 While in part an unapologetic declaration of 
presence on the American stage-"secularism is coming out of the 
closet" stated the Reason Rally homepage136-and while assuring the 
public that it was not the point of the rally to "trash religion,"137 what 
else is a reason rally other than a celebration of reason associated 
with the secular and not associated with religion? Religion 
presumably functions by reliance on sources other than reason--<>n 
tradition, for example. As the late Paul Kurtz, who popularized the 
term "secular humanism" put it, "[ m ]odem physics and astronomy 
began by stepping outside religious authority." 138 
David Niose, president of the American Humanist Association, 
while maintaining that nonbelievers do not claim a "monopoly on 
rationality,"139 nevertheless described the rally as celebrating those 
who use reason, in an op-ed published the day before. 140 The piece 
touted a political realignment in view of the overwhelming political 
success of religious conservatives and the strong support that 
nonbelievers routinely deliver to the Democratic Party: "[f]or over 
three decades, political debates in America have often centered on the 
issue of appeasing religious conservatives . . . . [L ]ittle harm could 
134. George Eaton, Preview: Richard Dawkins Interviews Christopher Hitchens, THE NEW 
STATESMAN (Dec. 13, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-
staggers/20 11/12/dawkins-hitchens-catholic. 
135. See Press Release, Reason Rally Marks Turning Point for Secular Movement, 
American Politics, REASONRALL Y I (Mar. 22, 20 12), http://reasonrally.org/wp-
content/uploads/20 11 /09/Reason-Rally-Marks-Turning-Point-for. pdf. 
136. The Reason Rally: A Celebration of Secular Values, REASONRALLY.ORG, 
http://reasonrally.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 20, 20 13). 
137. !d. 
138. PAUL KURTZ, THE TURBULENT UNIVERSE 20 (2013). 
139. David Niose, Op-Ed., The Rise of the Secular Political Movement, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Mar. 23, 2013 12:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/opinionlperspectives/the-rise-of-the-secular-political-movement-
627720/. 
140. See id. 
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come from making room at the table for a segment of the population 
that centers its world view on critical thinking and reason."141 
Obviously, this formulation is meant to contrast nonbelievers with 
others who do not center their worldview on critical thinking and 
reason. Leiter participates in this division. 
Another recent cultural marker of the increasing distance between 
believers and nonbelievers was the anti-religion billboard campaign 
in the spring of 2012 mounted by American Atheists and other 
groups. 142 Here is how the editors of the online magazine Religion 
Dispatches described the campaign: "This spring, billboards sprouted 
across the country like cranky, God-hating daffodils. They 
proclaimed the bad news that God does not exist, that belief is bad for 
your soul, that religion enslaves .... "143 
Anthony Pinn, Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University, 
described what the campaign aimed at: "Billboards, rallies, biting 
commentary-all this is meant to deconstruct the cultural worlds 
framing sacred texts and ideas, and to do deep damage to the 
stronghold religion has on life in the United States."144 
Aside from the attack on religion and belief-in-God, there has been 
another, and even more significant, recent manifestation of secular 
animosity against religion. In a variety of contexts, religion has been 
challenged as discriminatory. 145 Part of this narrative of 
discrimination arises from the opposition of much of American 
141. Id. 
142. See Ben Yakas, See Monday's Controversial Anti-Religion Billboard, Today!, 
GOTHAMIST (Mar. 1, 2012,5:21 PM), 
http:/ I gothamist.com/20 12/03/01 /see_mondays_controversial_anti -reli.php. 
143. Anthony B. Pinn, Can Atheist Billboards Kill Religion?, RELIGION DISPATCHES 




145. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971,2994-95 (2010); Catherine 
Poe, Contraception Battle: Not a War on Religion, But a War on Women, WASH. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/ad-
lib/2012/feb/10/contraception-battle-not-war-religion-war-women/; Hunter Stuart, 
Alabama Government Agency Holds Prayer Against Abortion, Gay Marriage, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 23, 2013, 11 :4 7 AM), 
http://www .huffmgtonpost.com/20 13/07 /25/alabama-prayer-gay-
marriage_n_3651756.htrnl; Vanderbilt University Policy Forces Catholic Group Off 
Campus, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 29,2012, 12:07 AM), 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/vanderbilt-university-policy-forces-
catholic-group-off-campus/. 
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organized religion against gay marriage and abortion. 146 Part of this 
narrative comes from the fight over the contraception mandate in the 
Affordable Care Act. 147 Catherine Poe called the mostly religious 
opposition to that mandate a "war on women" on the Washington 
Times blog. 148 That phrase is not uncommon among nonbelievers 
these days. 
Perhaps the strangest aspect of the association of religion with 
discrimination is the fight over membership in religious organizations 
on college campuses. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 149 the 
United States Supreme Court held that Hastings Law School could 
condition official recognition of a student group on the group's 
willingness to embrace an all-comers policy-that membership and 
leadership in the group would be open to all students.150 This 
precedent could lead to a wave of disaffiliations by religious campus 
groups. In March 2012, for example, Vanderbilt University forced a 
Catholic student group off campus when the group would not rescind 
a requirement that its leaders be Catholic.151 I call this strange 
because it seems absurd to me that student groups are criticized 
because they insist on some kind of common commitment for a 
group-as if the Young Democrats are being close-minded if they 
insist on the leader of their group having a formal affiliation with the 
Democratic Party in order to be a leader of their group. 
Religious leaders have responded to, or even preempted, these 
challenges by nonbelievers in a variety of ways that are themselves 
increasingly combative. At a meeting sponsored by the Ethics and 
Public Policy Center's American Religious Freedom Program in May 
2012, for example, Richard Land, who heads the Southern Baptist 
Convention's Ethics & Religion Liberty Commission, described 
secular hostility to religion in fundamental political/theological 
terms: "Secularists don't like people of faith because the ultimate 
authority for us is not the state. The ultimate authority is God."152 
146. See, e.g., Stuart, supra note 145. 
147. See Poe, supra note 145. 
148. /d. 
149. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coli. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
150. /d. at 2994-95. 
151. See Vanderbilt University Policy Forces Catholic Group Off Campus, supra note 145. 
152. The Motley Monk, The Obama Administration's Attack on Religious Freedom, THE 
AMERICAN CATHOLIC (May 25, 2012), http://the-american-
catholic.com/2012/05/25/the-obama-administrations-attack-on-religious-freedom-the-
second-vatican-councils-spirit-of-ecumenism-at-work/. 
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The main response by believers, and in fact the subject of the May 
meeting, has been to assert that religious liberty in the United States 
is under threat and to cite some of the contexts of the attacks by 
nonbelievers as evidence of that threat. 153 So, pressure on clergy to 
cooperate with gay marriage, pressure on religious campus groups to 
open membership, pressure on believers to participate in providing 
abortion services, pressure on religious organizations to cooperate in 
certain forms of law enforcement, and so forth, are all cited as threats 
against religious believers-as is the general attitude among 
nonbelievers that religion is a negative social phenomenon. 
The U.S. Catholic bishops have been the most vocal and dramatic 
religious voice of opposition. The bishops urged Catholics and "all 
people of faith" to observe March 30, 2012 as a day of prayer and 
fasting for religious freedom. 154 Undoubtedly, the reason the bishops 
took the lead is that the contraception mandate that is part of the 
Affordable Care Act does not present a direct threat to the teachings 
of most Protestant denominations. Nevertheless, the same general 
tenor has now been adopted by the leadership of many-though 
certainly not all-religious groups in America. 
An aspect of all this rhetoric was undoubtedly the pressure of a 
Presidential re-election campaign that was regarded by many as a 
potential watershed event in terms of the long-term health of religious 
liberty in America. 155 Certainly, since the November 2012 election, 
the rhetoric on both sides has not been as heated. Nevertheless, the 
litigation over the contraception mandate is continuing156 and will 
153. /d. 
154. See U.S. Bishops Set March 30 as Day of Prayer, Fasting for Religious Liberty, 
CATHOLIC SENTINEL, 
http://www.catholicsentinel.org/main.asp?SectioniD=2&SubSectionlD=34&ArticleiD 
= 17772 (last visited Dec. 20, 20 13) ("The bishops announced the day long observance 
in a statement titled 'United for Religious Freedom' that was approved March 14 by 
the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Administrative Committee. They asked 
Catholics and others to join them in 'prayer and penance for our leaders and for the 
complete protection of our first freedom-religious liberty-which is not only 
protected in the laws and customs of our great nation, but rooted in the teachings of 
our great tradition."'). 
155. See Brian Tashman, After Obama's Re-Election, Religious Right Demands 
Repentance and Resistance, RIGHT WING WATCH (Nov. 8, 2012, 3:40 PM), 
http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/obama-reelection-religious-right-repentance-
resistance (cataloguing anti-Obama rhetoric from a variety of religious groups and 
figures). 
156. See, e.g., Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-CV-440, 2013 WL 
1189854, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013) (dismissing Catholic plaintiffs' suit on 
ripeness grounds); Cheryl Wetzstein, Lawsuit Takes on Birth Control Mandate, 
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lead to a renewed political focus once a case is accepted for review 
by the Supreme Court. 
What lies in store for the future of legal debates about the role of 
religion? It is hard to be optimistic about finding common ground 
between believers and nonbelievers. Increasingly in law, even the 
starting points in debates about religion are at issue and there often 
seems to be a failure to communicate. Despite the undoubted 
presence of goodwill on both sides, believers and nonbelievers have a 
hard time hearing each other. I cite three illustrations below of what I 
mean, but first let me describe what I see as happening in more 
general terms. 
Among legal academics on the secular side, a more penetrating 
critique of religion has emerged-one that refuses to cede to religion 
a unique normative authority that used to be taken for granted. Leiter 
is a good example of this tendency. As we have seen, Leiter denies 
the uniqueness of religion and contests the justification for religious 
exemptions from generally applicable laws.157 In terms of the 
Establishment Clause, there is, at the same time, growing hostility to 
the presence of religious imagery in the public square, which is also 
hinted at in Leiter's book. 158 
On the other side, legal academics that defend religion are 
beginning to challenge the traditional assumptions that there can be 
an adequate secular justification for law and that constitutional law is 
an appropriate vehicle for the regulation of religion in American 
public life. 159 This newly assertive religious view seeks to overturn 
the secular paradigm and return religion to a foundational role 
undergirding the legitimacy of law. 160 This religious view denies that 
constitutional law can serve as a neutral referee in disputes about 
WASH. TIMES (Dec. II, 2012), 
http://www.washingtontimes.cornlnews/2012/dec/11/lawsuit-takes-on-birth-control-
mandate/. 
157. LEITER, supra note 2, at I (discussing one religious exemption from generally 
applicable laws and one nonreligious exemption). 
158. !d. at 139-40 n.6 (noting that while atheists and agnostics may sometimes raise 
exemption issues, their claims really sound in Establishment Clause terms challenging 
government religiosity). 
159. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1159, 1161-63 (2013) (arguing that religious truth 
exists and should form the basis of constitutional interpretation and the ordering of 
government involvement in public life). 
160. See Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of 
Judicial Decision-Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 709, 718-21 (2004) (exploring 
several models of secular and religious judicial decision-making and advocating for 
uniform judicial reliance on religious justifications). 
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religion and celebrates the Supreme Court's recent turn to ~tanding to 
avoid deciding Establishment Clause cases. 161 Under this scenario, 
the role of religion in public life is to be left to democratic forces to 
determine or is to be judicially protected from a religiously justified 
standpoint. 162 
Three recent and well-known events in the American legal 
academy illustrate these tendencies: a panel at a January 2012 
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) meeting over the 
ministerial exception case, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, 163 a November 
2011 debate at Georgetown Law School between Michael McConnell 
and Noah Feldman concerning whether religious liberty is special, 164 
and the Religious Legal Theory conference at Pepperdine Law 
School in February 2012.165 Nothing that occurred at these events 
diverged from positions already present in the scholarly literature, but 
the juxtaposition of these three events seemed to mark a defining 
moment in relations among believing and nonbelieving law faculty. 166 
The AALS panel, entitled Church Autonomy, the Ministerial 
Exception and Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, took place on Saturday, 
January 7, 2012, just a few days before the decision came down 
unanimously upholding the concept of the ministerial exception 
(January 11).167 The participants on the panel were well-known in the 
field. 168 Douglas Laycock, for example, perhaps the most influential 
161. Id. at 732-33; see Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) 
(holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge government funding of faith-
based initiatives). 
162. See Modak-Truran, supra note 160, at 731-33. 
163. Final Program: Academic Freedom and Academic Duty, Ass'N AM. L. SCHS. XXVIII, 
55, Dec. 9, 2011, http://www.aals.org/am2012/2012program.pdf [hereinafter Final 
Program]. 
164. Noah Feldman & Michael McConnell, Keynote Debate at the Berkley Center for 
Religion, Peace & World Affairs Conference: Is Religious Freedom an Independent or 
Derivative Right? (Nov. 17, 2011), available at 
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events/what-s-so-special-about-religious-
freedom. 
165. Pepperdine Univ. Sch. of Law Conference: The Competing Claims of Law and 
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? (Feb. 23-25, 2012) (conference agenda and 
program may be viewed at https://law.pepperdine.edulnootbaar/news-
events/events/law-and-religion/Nootbaar-Law-and-Religion-Brochure.pdf). 
166. For an earlier reference of the tensions between believers and nonbelievers on law 
school faculties, see STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 34-35 (2004). 
167. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
710 (2012); Final Program, supra note 163, at XXVII-XXVIII. 
168. Richard W. Garnett of Notre Dame Law School was the moderator. The speakers 
were Caroline Mala Corbin, University of Miami School of Law, Leslie C. Griffm, 
26 University of Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 43 
neutrality !heorist in the country, argued the case for the Lutheran 
Church, and most of the other participants were involved in preparing 
briefs on one side or the other in the Supreme Court. 169 
Listening to the presentations, I was amazed at the divergence of 
the starting points, which one would not necessarily expect, even in a 
controversial legal dispute. As if to emphasize that there is a gender 
divide in the academy over matters of religion, both Leslie Griffin 
and Caroline Mala Corbin argued that religion should not be above 
the law, a framework that Laycock strongly rejected. He and Robert 
Tuttle emphasized the autonomy of religion in American history, a 
special status that did not seem at all to move Corbin and Griffin. 
The latter wanted to subsume religious liberty under a broader 
heading of associational freedom, much as Leiter would subsume it 
under the rubric of conscience. 
The divide on the panel was reflected indirectly in the opinion in 
Hosanna-Tabor that came down a few days later. 17° Chief Justice 
Roberts' opinion rejected the government's position that there is no 
such thing as a ministerial exception, and that churches and other 
religious organizations must rely on "the constitutional right to 
freedom of association" rather than any right "grounded in the 
Religion Clauses themselves."171 The Chief Justice called the 
government's position "that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say 
about a religious organization's freedom to select its own ministers," 
a "remarkable view,"172 which was surely not an admiring comment. 
How often has it occurred that the federal government argues a 
case to the Supreme Court and loses unanimously in this way at the 
starting point of analysis? It must be rare. It seems to me that the 
University of Houston Law Center, Douglas Laycock, University of Virginia School 
of Law, Christopher C. Lund, Wayne State University Law School, and Robert W. 
Tuttle, The George Washington University Law School. Final Program, supra note 
163, at XXVII, XXVIII. 
169. See Brief for Professor Eugene Vo1okh et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470847 (prepared in part by 
Richard Garnett); Brief for Law and Religion Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470847 
(prepared in part by Caroline Mala Corbin and Leslie C. Griffin); Brief for the 
Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hosanna-
Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470848 (prepared in part by 
Christopher C. Lund); Audrey Waldrop, Prof Goes to High Court, CAVALIER DAILY, 
Oct. 6, 2011, http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2011110/prof-goes-to-high-court. 
170. See generally Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704-06 (reciting and following the 
Supreme Court's precedent of providing legal autonomy to religion). 
171. /d. at 706. 
172. /d. 
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Justices were reflecting a worldview that took the preferred and 
special status of religion for granted and seemed startled at the notion 
that religion is not special and might have to fend for itself along with 
other claimants of nonreligious associational freedom. 
This clash of worldviews was also on display in the McConnell-
Feldman debate. 173 Feldman claimed that the presence of protections 
for religion in the Constitution is merely a historical contingency and 
challenged McConnell to justify normatively the claimed special 
status of religion-by which Feldman meant claims to exemptions 
from what the Smith opinion called "neutral laws of general 
applicability,"174 to which the Free Exercise Clause was said in that 
case to provide no protection. 
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion in Hosanna-Tabor denied that Smith 
contradicted the result in that case-recognition of the ministerial 
exception to neutral laws-because Smith concerned individual 
conduct versus the institutional integrity that was at issue in 
Hosanna-Tabor. 175 But from Feldman's perspective, it would follow 
that whatever protections religious institutions enjoy should be 
enjoyed by institutions associated with other morally serious 
commitments, such as the Sierra Club, or the Federalist Society. If 
Smith is to be superseded by statutory protections for religion, those 
protections should also be available to nonreligious claims of 
conscience. 
Challenges to the settled assumptions of law and religion were also 
present at the third Religious Legal Theory conference at 
Pepperdine. 176 However, these challenges came primarily from a 
newly assertive pro-religion perspective. The opening speaker at the 
conference, Michael Stokes Paulsen, challenged the Feldman position 
(without reference to Feldman himself), arguing that the Vietnam 
draft cases, which applied religious exemptions to persons who were 
173. Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164. 
174. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990), superseded 
by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion was responding to Justice O'Connor's characterization, but he accepted it as a 
fair summary of his opinion. 
175. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
176. The various talks are all available for viewing. The Competing Claims of Law and 
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCH. OF L. (Feb. 23-25, 
2012) (downloaded using iTunes). A number of the talks have been gathered in a 
special issue of the Pepperdine Law Review. Symposium, The Competing Claims of 
Law and Religion, 39 PEPP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1051 (2013). 
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not traditional believers, went too far. 177 According to Pauisen, 
religious and secular claims to liberty are different. The recognition 
of God's, or the gods', claims on believers is the basis for the religion 
clauses in the Constitution.178 This theory amounts to a religious 
defense of religious liberty that denied a secular foundation to the 
constitutional right-as was noted in response by commentator 
Eugene Volokh. 179 
Another of the plenary presenters, James Davison Hunter, 
presented an additional aspect of the newly assertive religious 
narrative, arguing that the secularization thesis is being debunked and 
that we are in a post-secular period in which the model of distinct 
spheres between religion and the secular (the model present in the 
Hosanna-Tabor opinion) is overdrawn. 180 Nor is the current 
constitutional regime neutral as between religion and the secular, but 
rather represents a promotion of secularism.181 
Steven Smith, a very well-known figure in law and religion circles, 
asked directly in the same plenary session in which Professor Hunter 
spoke, "is secularism in crisis?," which he answered in the 
affirmative.182 Professor Smith echoed the claim that the 
secularization thesis has failed and that the neutrality that law has 
claimed is not neutral. 183 
But the clearest challenge to the traditional law and religion 
paradigm was the attempt to reinterpret the foundations of law, and 
the legitimacy of law, from theological sources. Zachary Calo put 
this claim most succinctly when he spoke of freeing law from its 
secular captivity.184 Other speakers at the conference, notably David 
Opderbeck, and, from a different angle, Mark Modak-Truran, also 
challenged the secular foundations of law. 185 
177. See Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1196-1203. 
178. See id. at 1163--64. 
179. See Eugene Volokh, The Priority of Law: A Response to Michael Stokes Paulsen, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1223, 1225-29 (2013). 
180. See James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion, and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1065, 1070--71 (2013). 
181. See id. at l 078. 
182. Law, Religion, and the Common Good: Reflections on Challenges of Late Modernity 
on The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?, 
PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCH. OF L. (Feb. 23-25, 2012) (downloaded using iTunes). 
183. !d. Professor Smith's presentation was not included in the Law Review issue. 
184. Zachory R. Calo, FaithfUl Presence and Theological Jurisprudence: A Response to 
James Davison Hunter, 39 PEPP. L. REv. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1083, 1083 (2013). 
185. Who Should Influence Whom on The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who 
Should Influence Whom?, PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCH. OF L. (Feb. 23-25, 2012) 
(downloaded using iTunes); Secularization on The Competing Claims of Law and 
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The conference was not monolithic. Micah Schwartzman, for 
example, strongly echoed and deepened the Feldman and Leiter 
position that there is nothing distinctively normative in religion to 
warrant special protections from generally applicable laws.186 In fact, 
an increasing conflict of worldviews was visible at the conference. 
Some defenders of religion in the legal academy are clearly set on 
reclaiming ground they feel has been illegitimately ceded to the 
secular. In contrast with these religious voices, the secularly oriented 
do not share the view that secularism is in crisis. They are not 
willing to accept a more religiously based legal regime. 
The similarities and differences between many believers and 
nonbelievers in the context of increasing distance over the 
importance of religion may be summarized as follows. For the 
believer, religion is different from nonreligion-belief from 
nonbelief. They are mutually exclusive categories and can each be 
defined, at least to some extent. Of the two categories, religion is of 
special significance, compared to any of the moral commitments that 
a nonbeliever might have. For the nonbeliever, religion is also 
different from nonreligion-belief from nonbelief. But, in contrast to 
the believer, the nonbeliever does not consider religion to be of 
unique significance. The moral commitments of the nonbeliever are 
of equal normative weight compared to religious commitments. 
This is why the believers and nonbelievers disagree about the 
justification for religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. 
Although both agree that religion can be distinguished from 
nonreligion, for the nonbeliever, extending exemptions to religious 
belief only is not justified.187 For the believer, in contrast, such 
restricted religious exemptions are usually justified. 188 The growing 
gap between believers and nonbelievers can thus be seen to begin, 
Religion: Who Should lrifluence Whom?, PEPPERDINE UNN. SCH. OF LAW (Feb. 23, 
2012) (downloaded using iTunes). 
186. Professor Schwartzman published an article based on this presentation. Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 1351 (2012). 
Schwartzman endorses the analogical approach to granting religious exemptions to 
secular beliefs and indeed endorses and constitutionalizes the Vietnam draft cases in a 
manner similar to that of this article. See id. at 1419-20. Not surprisingly, the 
fundamental difference between us lies in the conceptualization of claims like those in 
Seeger and Welsh. For Schwartzman, those not affiliated with traditional religions 
remain "nonbelievers" with "secular doctrines that cannot be distinguished . . . from 
their religious counterparts." !d. at 1421. Schwartzman cannot ask, what if we are all 
religious, even though many of his conclusions would be the same. 
187. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 132-33. 
188. See id. at 92-93. 
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surprisingly, in an agreement between the two sides that religion and 
nonreligion-belief and nonbelief-are different. This, as shown 
above, is specifically Leiter's starting point. Thus, generally, critics 
of religion who favor Leiter's Anti-Religion Equality Project and 
defenders of religion, who reject it, share this same starting point 
concerning the difference between religion and nonreligion. 189 
IV. EVALUATING LEITER'S PROJECT 
When Why Tolerate Religion? is discussed, the first point raised is 
generally whether Leiter has succeeded in showing that religious 
conscience is entitled to no greater level of protection than is 
nonreligious conscience.190 Leiter himself begins his book with this 
question of special protections for religion. 191 
To make the case against the special value of religion, however, 
one must be able to distinguish religious conscience from 
nonreligious conscience, which means distinguishing religion as a 
separate realm. That requires a definition of religion, which Leiter 
attempts to give. 192 Does he succeed? 
As stated above, Leiter attempts in Chapter 2 to defme religion in 
terms of the nature of its demands on the believer vis-a-vis generally 
applicable law .193 Leiter presents three characteristics of religion that 
he claims distinguish it from other realms of conscience: religion 
issues in categorical demands on action, it does not answer ultimately 
189. See Schwartzman, supra note 186, at 1370 (stating that religion is different from 
nonreligion); see also Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164. 
190. See, e.g., Robert Merrihew Adams, Why Tolerate Religion?, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REvs. 
(Jan. 6, 2013) (book review), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/36599-why-tolerate-religion/; 
Stanley Fish, Op-Ed., Religious Exemptions and the Liberal State: A Christmas 
Column, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2012, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/religious-exemptions-and-the-
liberal-state-a-christmas-column; Book Notes, 38 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 538, 544 
(2013) ("[Leiter's] book addresses the philosophical and constitutional puzzle of why 
religion is singled out for preferential treatment in law and public discourse in the 
United States, for example, why religious obligations that conflict with the law are 
recorded toleration while other obligations of conscience are not."). 
191. The book opens with the two instances of claimed exemptions from a generally 
applicable weapons ban in public school: one religiously-based and one not. See 
LEITER, supra note 2, at 1-3. 
192. See id. at 31-37. 
193. Despite referring to a definition of religion, it is not clear that Leiter really is trying to 
define religion in general. See id. at 34-37. There are no references to, or discussion 
of, rites, practices, or rituals as typical defming characteristics of religion. See id. at 
31-37. It might be more accurate to say that Leiter is attempting to define the 
demands of religious conscience rather than attempting to define religion itself. 
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to evidence and reason, and it renders death and suffering 
intelligible. 194 
Of these three characteristics, only one-the insulation from 
evidence-is really held by Leiter to apply to religion alone. Leiter 
admits that certain systems of morality in principle also issue in 
categorical demands, though he claims that as a practical matter only 
religion gives much effect to this categoricity.195 Obviously, the fact 
that only a small number of people act categorically on the basis of 
morality, thus contradicting Leiter's definition of religion, does not 
remove the contradiction. Morality can issue in categorical demands 
on behavior. Therefore, categorical demand on action is not a unique 
characteristic of religion. 
Similarly, Leiter states very clearly that "nonreligious individuals 
find ways of achieving existential consolation" without engaging in 
religion. 196 So, this characteristic also does not distinguish religion 
uniquely. 
The characteristic of religion that remains, and indeed the one that 
does all the work in Leiter's book of distinguishing and devaluing 
religious claims of conscience, is the claimed insulation from reason 
and evidence. 197 How convincing is Leiter's claim that there are at 
least some central beliefs of every religion that do not ultimately 
answer to evidence and reason? 
This is not an easy matter, but overall Leiter's position is either 
false or at least drastically overstated. In the first place, we all decide 
matters, even important matters, without reference to reason and 
evidence. 198 Leiter undoubtedly would respond that, while this may 
be true, outside the religious realm, people can at least change our 
minds in light of new evidence. But how often do we actually do 
this? 199 How many business people changed their minds about the 
efficient market hypothesis after the collapse of financial markets in 
2008? How many liberals changed their minds about President 
Reagan's policies after the collapse of the Soviet Union? Paul 
194. /d. at 34, 52. 
195. See id. at 38-39. 
196. Id. at 62. 
197. For example, the main reason Leiter gives for not respecting religion in chapter 4 is 
the insulation of religion from evidence. See id. at 81. 
198. See LEONARD MLODINOW, SUBLIMINAL: HOW YOUR UNCONSCIOUS MIND RULES YOUR 
BEHAVIOR (2012). 
199. John Gray made this similar point in his review of Leiter in New Statesman. John 
Gray, Why Tolerate Religion? Most of Our Beliefs are Unwarranted, Even Absurd, 
Says John Gray, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 29, 2010, 
http://www .newstatesman.corn/print/culture/culture/20 12/ II /giant -leaps-mankind. 
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Krugman has been complaining for quite some time that despite all of 
the evidence showing that austerity policies have failed to generate 
economic growth, people keep on proposing austerity as a program to 
combat our economic ills. 200 
Leiter might say this is all a matter of degree. Religious dogmas 
are even less subject to disproof than are other kinds of beliefs. But I 
wonder if he is right. He certainly adduces no evidence to show this. 
He just assumes it out of a kind of secular prejudice against the 
rationality of religion. 
It is not even clear what Leiter means by "insulated from reason" 
and evidence.201 When Leiter refers to "ordinary standards of reasons 
and evidence in common sense and the sciences,"202 he is claiming, in 
effect, that everyone knows-it is a matter of common sense-that 
miracles are impossible and angels don't exist. While I agree with 
Leiter on these matters, I am also aware that most people do not agree 
with him or with me, and that they have their reasons for hot 
agreeing. Leiter fails to acknowledge that the reasons that support 
certain religious beliefs are not unreasonable. 
Take two famous examples: the writing of the Qur'an and the 
resurrection of Jesus. In terms of the Qur'an, sincere Muslims have 
asked me whether, given all we know historically about the Prophet 
Mohammed, I really believe that Mohammed alone wrote the Qur'an. 
The fact is that I don't believe that. It does not seem possible. I 
simply assume, irrefutably, as I am certain Leiter assumes as well, 
that the Qur'an was not dictated to the Prophet Mohammed by an 
angel, as the tradition asserts. But, I recognize that this is just my 
assumption. The assumption that dictation by an angel would be 
impossible does not answer, however, the question of how the Qur'an 
came to be written. 
In terms of the resurrection, N.T. Wright has firmly pressed the 
argument that, given all we know, the resurrection must actually have 
happened.203 Certainly, something strange must have happened. It is 
more likely that the Taliban would begin holding cocktail parties than 
it is that pious Jews of the 1st century A.D. would countenance eating 
pork a few years after the death of Jesus, unless something 
extraordinary had happened. -
200. See Paul Krugman, How the Case for Austerity Has Crumbled, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, 
June 6, 2013, http://www.nybooks.cornlarticles/archives/20 13/jun/06/how-case-
austerity-has-crumbled/. 
20 I. LEITER, supra note 2, at 81. 
202. /d. 
203. 3 N.T. WRIGHT, THE RESURRECTION OF THE SON OF GOD 717 (2003). 
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As to the nature of that "something," the question is: what did 
happen to the body of Jesus? There seems to be no historical reason 
to doubt that Temple authorities began to persecute the nascent Jesus 
movement shortly after the crucifixion. Since rumors of the 
resurrection apparently circulated soon after the crucifixion, it may be 
inferred that the Temple authorities would have announced the 
location of Jesus' body, if they had known where it was in order to 
discredit the new heretical movement. Conversely, it would take an 
extreme anachronism to suppose that pious Jews buried Jesus and 
knew where his body lay, but kept quiet in order to manipulate public 
opinion about the resurrection. The third possibility is that no one 
cared where Jesus was buried, and therefore the knowledge of the 
location was lost. But this seems unlikely, given the public nature 
and scandal of crucifixion itself. 
I realize that this does not prove anything. People like Leiter and 
me believe the resurrection did not happen because nothing like 
resurrection can happen, based on the laws science has discovered. I 
just wish Leiter would acknowledge that both my position and his are 
based on a pre-existing worldview. He and I are not considering the 
possibility of angels and resurrection and are not really weighing the 
evidence. 
Not only do all human beings come to conclusions without reasons 
sometimes, and maybe even most of the time, and not only are there 
reasons adducible to support religious doctrines Leiter fmds 
epistemologically unwarranted, but it is an exaggeration that religious 
belief does not respond to the kinds of scientific and common sense 
arguments that Leiter considers normative. The power of scientific 
conclusions over even highly conservative religious believers is 
demonstrated by the insistence in the debates over the teaching of 
evolution in the public schools that "evolution "is only a theory."204 
If evolution is only a theory, then the religious believer can oppose it 
without opposing science itself. 
This formal deference by religious believers to science, at least 
theoretically, is also why the alleged weaknesses in evolutionary 
theory-the supposed impossibility of evolving an eye, for 
example205-are deemed to be so significant by supporters of a 
204. See, e.g., Mark Isaak, Five Major Misconceptions About Evolution, TALKORIGINS 
(Oct. I, 2003), http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/faq-misconceptions.html. 
205. This criticism is voiced so frequently that it has its own rebuttal by evolutionists. See 
Is the Eye Too Complex to Have Evolved Naturally?, EVOLUTION F AQ, 
http://www.evolutionfaq.com/faq/eye-too-complex-have-evolved-naturally (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
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biblically based account of creation. Where possible, there is a clear 
desire to be at home with science and not to directly confront it. 
Nor is this strategy merely a means to avoid judicial condemnation 
of creationism under the Establishment Clause. The epistemological 
basis of this religious evolution strategy is demonstrated by the 
relative absence of challenges to the teaching of geology in the public 
schools. At one time, the age of the earth might also have been 
challenged "as only a theory" in light of the literal reading of Genesis 
that shows the world to be only a few thousand years old.206 This 
"age of the earth" challenge to accepted scientific orthodoxy has 
collapsed not because it was not as essential to, or inherent in, 
Christian thought at one time as was opposition to evolutionary 
theory, but because of the seemingly insurmountable scientific 
support for a range of interconnected dating techniques that show a 
universe 13.8 billion years old and an earth around 4.5 billion years 
old.zo7 
But even if Leiter were accurate in his description of some 
monotheistic sects as resistant to "evidence and reason," his 
definition of religion would still fall short, because, to serve Leiter's 
purpose, his description must apply to all religions and to religion 
uniquely. It is easy to see that resistance to what Leiter considers 
evidence and reason is not unique to religion, but it is also obvious 
that different religious traditions are resistant to scientific discoveries 
to differing extents. Indeed, the differing degrees of acceptance or 
hostility to the scientific revolutions of the modem age are one of the 
markers of a liberal versus an orthodox and conservative 
Christianity.208 
Leiter knows that he has a quandary here and he deals with it in an 
almost shameful way-by dismissing with the merest nod the work 
of people like William Alston and Alvin Plantinga as "nothing more 
than an effort to insulate religious faith from ordinary standards of 
206. Most specifically, if not most famously, Archbishop James Ussher, in 1658, 
calculated the moment of creation as occurring on the night preceding Sunday, 
October 23,4004 BC. JAMES USSHER, THE ANNALS OF THE WORLD 7-8 (1658). 
207. See The Origin of the Universe- Three Views, MUSINGS ON Sci. & THEOLOGY (Aug. 
13, 20 13), http://musingsonscience. wordpress.com/20 13/08113/the-origin-of-the-
universe-three-views/. 
208. "We are well aware that there is a lot of traditional Christian theology that has to be 
revised in light of our contemporary scientific understanding, and that there are things 
that must simply be discarded. That's what being a Liberal Christian is about." James 
F. McGrath, Evolution and Liberal Christianity, PATHEOS (June 4, 2009), 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/exploringourmatrix/2009/06/evolution-and-liberal-
christianity.html. 
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reasons and evidence in common sense and the sciences . . . "209 
Leiter also dismisses the entire "intellectualist" tradition in religious 
thought, including William Paley and Thomas Aquinas, as "post-hoc-
rationalization," because "it never turns out that the fundamental 
beliefs are revised in light of new evidence."210 
It is not true that in these religious traditions fundamental beliefs 
have not been revised. Fundamental beliefs are not repudiated, but 
they come to be interpreted very differently.211 The "Cosmic Christ" 
of Teilhard de Chardin, for example, is obviously exquisitely 
sensitive to the findings of the scientific age.212 Leiter might insist 
here that efforts like these are unpersuasively vague or mystical. He 
might not be able to appreciate that efforts by believers to stretch 
language to reach transcendent religious truths are the way that 
religious believers who do accept the scientific tradition reinterpret 
the historic doctrines of their religions. Such responses may not be 
the way that Leiter would prefer that believers respond to evidence 
and reason, but these are responses that are clearly not insulated from 
evidence and reason. 
209. LEITER, supra note 2, at 81. 
210. !d. at 39--40. 
211. Robert Adams has made just this point in criticizing Leiter on this point: "Unless by 
'revised' Leiter means completely abandoned, this claim is simply false." Adams, 
supra note 190. 
212. See, for example, how Louis M. Savary explains the Cosmic Christ concept from de 
Chardin in an excerpt from his book, The Divine Milieu Explained: 
In The Spiritual Exercises, St. Ignatius taught Teilhard how to dig 
deeply into the mind and heart of Jesus of Nazareth and how to be 
transformed by his suffering, death, and resurrection. In the 
sixteenth century when Ignatius lived, he knew nothing of the 
many scientific facts that are simply part of our daily assumptions 
about reality. For most people then, the flat earth was the center 
of God's creation, and God lived up in the sky. And his 
traditional spirituality reflects those beliefs . . . . In The Divine 
Milieu, Teilhard the scientist takes us many centuries further in 
the life of Christ. He invites us to learn to see, as he does, not 
only the Christ of 2,000 years ago, but also the magnificent Being 
that the Risen Christ with his Total Body has developed into 
during two millennia. He also invites us to glimpse into Christ's 
future, to identify the goal toward which that Total Body of Christ 
has been constantly evolving. 
LOUIS M. SAVARY, TEILHARDDE CHARD IN THE DIVINE MILIEU EXPLAINED: A 
SPIRITUALITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY xiii-xiv (2007). 
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For the moment, let us assume that my criticism shows that Leiter 
fails in his effort to defme religion as a realm separate from 
nonreligious conscientious belief. Does that make any difference to 
Leiter's ultimate conclusion? 
The answer is no, but this seems counterintuitive, even 
preposterous. Leiter's book is all about religion. How can his 
fundamental failure to engage that very topic successfully turn out to 
mean nothing? 
The answer to that question lies in the peculiar terms of the is 
religion special? debate. That debate has always assumed that 
religion and nonreligion must be two distinct categories.213 That 
assumption was at its most peculiar display in the debate between 
Feldman and McConnell, adverted to above, in which, at a certain 
point, the two participants argued over whether Antigone's demand 
of conscience was religious or philosophical.214 
On reflection, it is obvious that a question like this-whether a 
character in ancient Greek drama is reflecting modem categories of 
belief and nonbelief-is simply incoherent. Philosophy and religion 
were intertwined in that age.215 To be fair, Professor McConnell 
appeared in the debate to be uncertain about how to answer such a 
question, perhaps because the question seemed so strange. But the 
fact that neither participant in the debate expressly stated the 
obvious-that the distinction between philosophy and religion could 
not be made in our terms in that context-demonstrates the agendas 
that distort discussion of the question whether religion is "special." 
Defenders of religion, like McConnell, do not wish to admit 
religion's shared connection with all human endeavors that seek 
meaning in existence, because they believe to do so would surrender 
special prerogatives that religion now enjoys both legally and 
culturally.216 Conversely, those who challenge religion, like 
Feldman, do not wish to admit that the category of religion is 
potentially vast, because the origins of their challenge lie in a 
modernist, rationalist skepticism that views religion as an 
213. See Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164 (posing the question of whether 
Antigone's actions were motivated by her religious or philosophical beliefs, 
demonstrating the assumption that the two categories are distinct). 
214. /d. 
215. See generally PIERRE HAooT, PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES 
FROM SOCRATES TO FOUCAULT (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Michael Chase trans. 1995) 
(explaining that religion and philosophy were so related that there was a constant 
conflict between Christians and pagans due to each group borrowing concepts from 
the other). 
216. See Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164. 
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indefensible, supernatural-based endeavor.217 If religion were viewed 
in a fuller and richer context, that skeptical challenge would collapse. 
Leiter takes the debate, is religion special?, one more step. Unlike 
Feldman, Leiter does not stop at comparing two separate realms-
religious conscience and nonreligious conscience-and concluding 
that they are of equal weight. Instead, Leiter argues that religious 
conscience is just a particular form of conscientious commitment.218 
Leiter then concludes that no form of conscientious commitment 
justifies exemption from generally applicable laws.219 
For all Leiter's endeavor to define religion, therefore, religion 
ultimately disappears in his argument as a separate category. That is 
why Leiter's failure to define religion adequately does not affect his 
conclusion. If Leiter, instead of attempting to define religion as a 
separate realm, had admitted that religion cannot easily be defined, 
that it shares a number of Wittgenstein family resemblances/20 he 
could still have concluded that all of these forms of conscience could 
be subsumed under conscience generally and that all such conscience 
claims should be subordinated to the pursuit of the common good by 
the state. 
Leiter's conclusion that there is no principled justification for 
exemption from generally applicable laws vindicates the fear of 
defenders of religion that losing the debate over the special value of 
religion will ultimately undermine religious liberty. Ironically, 
Leiter's project makes it clear that the subsumption of religion into 
conscience also potentially threatens nonreligious liberty of 
conscience.221 Leiter's conclusion is not about religion at all, but is 
about the dominance of the demands of the state.222 In Leiter's world, 
we are all equal, believers and nonbelievers, and we are all 
subservient to the state.223 This is the conclusion of the Anti-Religion 
Equality Project. 
But what if Leiter's failure to defme religion as a separate category 
were turned on its head? Is it possible that religion is not easily 
defined as a separate category because most people most of the time, 
217. !d. 
218. LEITER, supra note 2, at 64. 
219. !d. at 101. 
220. Wittgenstein famously stated that the concept of a game could not be defmed by rigid 
characteristics, but only by "family resemblances." LUDWIG WITIGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31e-32e (G.E.M. Anscornbe trans., 2nd ed. 1958). 
221. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 59. 
222. See id. at 14-15. 
223. See id. 
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and maybe all people at least some of the time, are engaged in 
religious quests? If that were understood to be the case, we would all 
be equal, as Leiter suggests, but the state would not necessarily be 
dominant. In the next part of this article, I attempt to unfold that Pro-
Religion Equality Project. 
V. THE PRO-RELIGION EQUALITY PROJECT 
What should the realm of conscientious belief be called? Certainly, 
that realm includes many beliefs that are not conventionally 
considered religions. So, perhaps the entire realm should be called 
conscience, which is Leiter's approach?24 But that realm also 
includes much of conventional religious belief. So, perhaps the realm 
should all be called religious. 
One way to resolve this question would be to allow the participants 
to defme their own categories. If we proceed that way, many 
participants in organized religions would insist that their beliefs are 
"religious" while the beliefs of persons not associated with organized 
religion are generally not "religious." Similarly, many persons who 
are not a part of organized religions would agree that their beliefs are 
not "religious," while the beliefs of people who are a part of 
organized religions are "religious." This is what was meant above-
that the participants in the is religion special? debate insist that 
religion and nonreligion are two separate realms. 
But I am not going to allow the participants in the debate to define 
their own positions. The participants in this debate are overstating, 
and thus enhancing, our differences. For reasons of their own 
agendas, they treat relative differences between believers and 
nonbelievers as absolute. In fact, most believers and nonbelievers 
have a great deal in common. 
But even assuming that the participants on both sides in this debate 
are wrong and there are not two separate realms, the question still 
remains: whether it is best to speak generally of conscience or of 
religion? Another way to proceed at this point would be to define 
religion broadly and then to insist that all manifestations of 
conscience fit into that definition. I cannot avoid doing a little of that 
as the reader will soon see, but general defmitions of religion are not 
going to be of much help in determining the reach of religious 
exemptions.225 Religion is simply too vast a phenomenon. 
224. See id. at 17. 
225. I agree entirely with Nelson Tebbe's comprehensive analysis on this point. See 
Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REv. II II, 1115 (20 II). Jeffrey Lipshaw has 
also criticized the either/or definitional approach in this context. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, 
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Wittgenstein is right that we are not dealing with defmitions, but with 
family resemblances.226 The question of religion or conscience 
cannot be decided by overarching definitions. 
So I will start at a more modest point. The context with which we 
are concerned is not religion in general or conscience in general. 
Rather, we are dealing with religious exemptions from generally 
applicable laws. Therefore, of the three qualities of religion in 
Leiter's definition-categorical demands, insulation from evidence 
and reason, and existential comfort-the most important quality is the 
issuance of categorical demands. For these types of demands are 
what bring the individual, conventionally religious or not, into 
conflict with the laws of the state. 
What is a categorical demand? Leiter defines it as a "demand[] that 
must be satisfied no matter what an individual's antecedent desires 
and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up ... 
• "
227 Remember that though Leiter is here defining religion, he would 
agree that nonreligious conscience can also make demands like 
this.228 
Let us take the example of the conscientious vegan. This person is 
going to resist any demand by the state to eat meat. The 
conscientious vegan is going to be willing to suffer sanctions rather 
than submit to such a demand. 229 
What accounts for this conscientious belief and willingness to 
suffer? It must be more than a general belief about how one should 
live. If someone believes, for example, that people should regularly 
exercise, that person would not be willing to go to jail for the sake of 
exercise if the state were to forbid it. The vegan who had simply 
concluded that eating meat is bad for one's health, would have no 
reason to go to jail, which is obviously very bad for one's health, 
rather than eat meat. 
It seems obvious that a vegan who is willing to suffer serious 
consequences to avoid eating meat must have concluded that killing 
animals and eating them is wrong. This is the core of Leiter's 
categorical demand. The person who feels that she must oppose the 
Can There Be a Religion of Reasons? A Response to Leiter's Circular Conception of 
Religious Belief, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 43,45-46 (2010-2011). 
226. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 220, at 31 e-32e. 
227. LEITER, supra note 2, at 34. 
228. See id. 
229. I recognize that among conscientious vegans, there will be differing levels of 
commitment and willingness to suffer. But that is obviously true of religious believers 
as well. 
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commands of the state despite the obvious harm this will do to her 
own self-interest must be a moral realist who has concluded that the 
state's demand is objectively wrong. The conscientious vegan does 
not say, "eating meat is wrong in my opinion" -or if she does, she 
does so for reasons of political correctness and does not really mean 
it. She means that eating meat is morally wrong for everyone. The 
force of a categorical demand is heard in Martin Luther's cry: "Here I 
stand. I can do nothing else.'mo 
The use of the Luther example is intentional because demands like 
this are usually associated with traditional religion. Such demands 
need not be commands by a God, though they are often believed to be 
such. A Buddhist, for example, might believe that it is wrong to kill 
or harm living beings without believing that there is a supernatural 
being issuing a command to that effect. Even though not necessarily 
theistic, categorical demands have usually been grounded in some 
form of traditional religion, which is a category that is widely 
understood. 231 
Nevertheless, despite this history, the commitment to objective 
morality need not be called religious. I have asserted that the 
tradition of moral realism is not a religious position, but a 
philosophical one.232 My change in terminology here has to do with 
the different roles of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause.233 
As I have argued elsewhere, moral realism, or the theory of 
objective value234-the belief that right and wrong are not just matters 
of opinion, but have to do with the nature of human beings and the 
nature of the universe-is shared by all the great wisdom 
traditions.235 It is, in the words of C.S. Lewis, "the belief that certain 
attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing 
230. ALAN ACKERMAN, JUST WORDS 98 (2013). This is often quoted as Luther's response 
before the Diet of Worms, but absent from eyewitness accounts. I know there are 
people who will say at this point that a moral subjectivist is also capable of standing 
up for a moral principle, even at great cost. The late Richard Rorty was undoubtedly 
such a person. I must admit that I simply cannot understand that position. I cannot 
understand why anyone would suffer for the sake of a mere preference. But see, e.g., 
S.T. JOSHI, Goo's DEFENDERS 115 (2003) (explaining the motivation of moral 
subjectivists to propagate the spread of their preferences). 
231. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 138 n.6. 
232. See Bruce Ledewitz, Seeking 'Common Ground': A Secular Statement, 38 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 49, 74 (2010). 
233. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827-28 ( 1978). 
234. I use these terms interchangeably. 
235. See BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM I 06 
(2011). 
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the universe is and the kind of things we are."236 This commitment 
can be called religious or nonreligious depending on the context. 237 
In Establishment Clause terms, the commitment to objective values 
cannot be considered an establishment of religion, because then the 
government could not teach moral realism or objective values 
without violating the Constitution.238 It is hard to imagine public 
elementary school instruction along relativist lines-would 
kindergarten teachers remind students that "in our culture, we take 
turns and do not take what does not belong to us?" The category of 
religion in the context of the Establishment Clause must be 
interpreted more narrowly than that. 
But in the context of free exercise values, the commitment to 
objective value is the very ground from which all categorical 
demands emerge. Religion in the context of free exercise and related 
statutory protections should be seen in precisely these broad terms. 
Religion in the sense of the tradition of objective values is the 
common ground that unites most of us in the face of the challenges of 
relativism and nihilism. 
There is nothing arbitrary in calling the commitment to objective 
values religious in this general sense. I will return to Ronald 
Dworkin's understanding of religion just before his death in the last 
Part of this article. But in an earlier view, in 1992, Dworkin argued 
that the commitment to the objectivity of values is a preeminent 
aspect of religion.239 In context, Dworkin was criticizing pro-life 
legislation as religiously motivated and thus potentially a violation of 
the Establishment Clause.240 Dworkin wrote that: 
the belief that the value of human life transcends its 
value for the creature whose life it is-that human life 
is objectively valuable from the point of view, as it 
were, of the universe-is plainly a religious belief, 
even when it is held by people who do not believe in a 
personal deity. It is, in fact, the most fundamental 
purpose of traditional religions to make exactly that 
236. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 29 (1947). 
237. See TRIBE, supra note 233, at 828. 
238. Some years ago, Larry Tribe argued for differing definitions of religion in Free 
Exercise cases versus Establishment Clause cases along these lines in his influential 
constitutional treatise. /d. at 827-28. 
239. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 381,413 (1992). 
240. /d. 
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claim to its faithful, and to embody it in some vision 
or narrative that makes the belief seem intelligible and 
persuasive. 241 
[Vol. 43 
Whether or not this God's-eye view of the universe is sensible 
without God-Hilary Putnam challenges it without surrendering at 
least a minimal moral realism242-is not the issue here. The 
conscientious vegan very likely considers animal life objectively 
valuable from the point of view of the universe, since it is at least 
questionable how one might rate an animal's life from its own point 
of view. Objective values require something akin to this kind of god-
like perspective. 
In linking religion and the objectivity of values as a criticism of 
legislation, Dworkin was making the mistake of mixing up 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause issues. Government is 
constantly teaching the objective value of human life-in public 
schools, in government programs, in official announcements-
without raising Establishment Clause concems.243 Dworkin could not 
possibly have meant that this entire edifice of objective values claims 
is unconstitutional as an establishment of religion. But Dworkin was 
right about the meaning of religion for purposes of the Free Exercise 
Clause and related statutes protecting religious liberty.244 There, 
moral realism is the mark of religious commitment. 
An additional ground for associating religion generally with the 
objectivity of values is the consistent support of moral relativism by 
critics of religion. At one time I would have said that the charge of 
moral relativism against atheists was a calumny. But it has since 
become clear to me that indeed this is the case. Leiter, for example, 
expressly rejects moral realism. 245 And, as I have argued elsewhere, 
the New Atheists also generally reject moral realism or the 
241. !d. at413-14. 
242. See HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 37 (James Conant ed., 1992) 
("And if a rebirth of a full-bodied, red-blooded metaphysical realism were the way to 
get people to accept the objectivity of ethics, then I would almost be willing to pay the 
price ofletting that happen."). 
243. See TRIBE, supra note 233, at 829 (stating that public schools may require a moment 
of silence or meditation without violating the Establishment Clause); President Barack 
Obama, Statement by the President on the School Shooting in Newtown, Connecticut 
(Dec. 14, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/20 12/12/14/president -obama-makes-statement-shooting-newtown-
connecticut#transcript (discussing the value of human life). 
244. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text. 
245. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 163 n.12. 
2014] Vietnam Draft Cases and the Pro-Religion Equality Project 43 
objectivity of values, though there is reason to doubt the consistency 
of their position.246 
But the most candid assertion of the relationship between moral 
subjectivism and religious skepticism is set forth in S.T. Joshi's 2003 
book, God's Defenders: What They Believe and Why They Are 
Wrong. 247 Joshi's book is an aggressive and breezy attack on seven 
so-called defenders of God248 and would not be cited as authoritative 
except for the fact that the book was published by Prometheus Books, 
which tends to be a reliable barometer for characterizing the thinking 
of current religious skepticism in America.249 
Joshi expressly states that while morals are "nothing more than 
preferences," they are still real, but only in the sense that they are 
"real preferences."250 He rejects C.S. Lewis's criticism of 
naturalism-for "naturalism" substitutes moral relativism or moral 
subjectivism-that if good and evil were really just illusions, the 
people who profess that position would not work so hard at 
improving the human race.251 Joshi claims that he prefers that his 
preferences be adopted by others, even though his own preferences 
are not objectively "true."252 
Joshi states the epistemological problem very succinctly. He writes 
that there are only two ways in which moral claims can be objectively 
right or wrong: either "there must be something built into the fabric 
of the universe that makes some moral values right and others 
wrong" or "a god or gods must dictate a code of morals to human 
beings."253 Since Joshi believes that the first option "is so obviously 
false that its mere utterance is sufficient to refute it,"254 the 
246. See LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM, supra note 
235, at 184 (discussing Richard Dawkins and the New Atheists). 
247. JOSHI, supra note 230. 
248. See id. at passim (labeling T.S. Eliot, William F. Buckley Jr., Jerry Fallwell, Annie 
Dillard, William James, G.K. Chesterton, and C.S. Lewis as God's defenders). 
249. John W. Loftus, Prometheus Books is the Premier Atheist Publisher in Our 
Generation, DEBUNKJNG CHRISTIANITY (Dec. 31, 2009), 
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2009/12/prometheus-books-is-premier-
atheist.html. The reader can get a feel for the sides concerning Prometheus by looking 
at John Loftus's blog entry defending the publishing house as the "premier atheist 
publisher of our generation." !d. 
250. JOSHI, supra note 230, at 115. 
251. !d. at 114-15. 
252. !d. at 115. 
253. !d. at 269. 
254. !d. 
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relationship between religion, and indeed theism, and moral realism 
is considered by him to be very close. 255 
But even if moral realism and religion are reasonably connected, 
and even if moral realism and categorical demands are connected, 
there is still the question of whether taking Leiter's first category as 
the basis for applying religious exemptions, as I am proposing here, 
is practical. Treating categorical demand as defming religion for 
purposes of religious exemptions from general laws may seem too 
broad for any court to actually apply. It suggests that the claimant's 
demand for exemption would always be determinative. Because of 
this problem, courts will inevitably end up applying something like 
an analogical approach to religious exemptions in which the beliefs 
of a claimant who is not a member of a traditional and organized 
religious group is compared to the beliefs of persons who are 
members of such groups.256 Kent Greenawalt has championed just 
such an approach, 257 and, as I will argue in the next Part, that was the 
basic approach of the United States Supreme Court in the Vietnam 
War draft cases.258 
The breadth, and therefore the impracticality, of using categorical 
demands as the ground of religious exemption is a practical problem, 
but it is not a theoretical one. In theory, and even in practice if only a 
judge could really get to know a particular claimant for a religious 
exemption, the genuine experience of a categorical demand would by 
itself be quite sufficient to justify a religious exemption. The 
willingness to suffer sanctions rather than violate one's beliefs, which 
is what Leiter means by a categorical demand, is precisely the kind of 
commitment that religious exemptions aim to protect.259 The 
practical problem is that exemptions exist and therefore we do not 
know who would be willing to suffer "for the sake of the name" as 
opposed to those who are claiming the exemption out of some lesser 
commitment. But if we could be sure of who is willing to suffer 
255. See id. at 269-70, 278-79, 302. 
256. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66, 173-74, 187 (1965). For a good 
example of the power of analogy in a slightly different religious context, see Malnak 
v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) stating, "[i]fthe old 
defmition [of religion] has been repudiated, however, the new definition remains not 
yet fully formed. It would appear to be properly described as a definition by analogy." 
/d. 
257. See I KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND 
FAIRNESS 139-41 (2006). 
258. See infra notes 272-88, 319-25 and accompanying text. 
259. See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943); LEITER, supra note 2, 
at 34. 
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severe consequences rather than obey the state, we would know who 
should be granted a religious exemption. 
It should also be noted that an empirical disagreement with the 
majority is not a ground of a categorical demand. A claimant for 
religious exemption who is asserting, in effect, "if matters were as 
you believe them to be, I would agree with you," is not responding to 
a categorical demand in Leiter's sense. 
This is not a distinction that can be pushed very hard. The 
conscientious vegan may very well have what might be termed 
empirical disagreements with the majority. She may believe that 
animals possess a self-consciousness and sensitivity that the majority 
disputes as a matter of fact. But that kind of disagreement is not fully 
empirical. The starting point of the vegan and the vegan's view of 
the burden of proof differ from that of the majority in ways that 
plainly reflect a value dispute rather than a purely empirical one. 
What I mean by an empirical disagreement will become clear in 
Part VI of this article, in which I discuss exemptions from mandatory 
vaccination laws. In that context, a parent who judges vaccinations 
to be dangerous to his child is not going to permit a vaccination to be 
performed and is going to be willing to suffer severe sanction rather 
than do so. Yet, if that same parent agreed with the majority that the 
danger of vaccination is minimal, the parent might agree that the risk 
is worth running for the sake of everyone, including his own child. I 
do not consider such a disagreement, though passionately disputed by 
the parent, to represent Leiter's categorical demand. 
We are now in a position to evaluate preliminarily the differences 
between the Pro-Religion Equality Project and the Anti-Religion 
Equality Project, though the differences will become clearer in the 
rest of this article. At this point, we can see that the equality of value 
between conscientious commitment grounded in traditional organized 
religion and other forms of conscientious commitment that is so 
important to Leiter is retained in the Pro-Religion Equality Project. 
But the treatment of this equality as representing a religious 
continuum changes Leiter's context. Specifically, the Pro-Religion 
Equality Project, because it utilizes the terminology of religion, is 
firmly grounded in the constitutional and statutory religion texts that 
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already exist to protect liberty,260 which is not the case with regard to 
conscience exemptions generally.261 
In addition, the commitment to moral realism provides a ground-
one which is not available to Leiter since he rejects moral 
realism262-upon which one can support robust protection of religious 
exemptions from generally applicable laws even when those 
exemptions impose some burdens on others. The ground for that 
protection is the possible truth of the religious claim, not just the 
effect of violating conscience on the claimant herself. The existence 
of religious exemptions can now reflect the judgment by the majority 
that the majority may be wrong in its demands. Leiter acknowledges 
this epistemological possibility, but since he views religion as he 
understands it to be insulated from reason and evidence,263 he 
denigrates the likelihood of much insight into knowledge from 
religious conscience. 
Another advantage of the Pro-Religion Equality Project is that it 
entirely sidesteps the issue of supernaturalism. Religion is more than 
supernaturalism. Religion is more than the belief in a supreme being 
independent of the material universe. Definitions of religion that 
begin with supernaturalism in order to apply, or not apply, religious 
exemptions are much too narrow to be of any use as principled 
justification. 264 
Finally, the greatest advantage of the Pro-Religion Equality Project 
is that it is not really new. As we shall see in the next Part, this 
approach is close to that of the Supreme Court in the Vietnam War 
draft cases. And I would like to think that its broad and liberal 
approach to religion is instinctively the default position of most 
Americans concerning the meaning of religion. 
260. These authoritative texts, such as the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, of course, refer to religion rather than conscience. See Tebbe, supra 
note 225, at 1114 ("[R]eligious freedom laws typically reference religion alone."). 
261. See id. ("Virtually everywhere that American law protects free exercise and non-
establishment it focuses on religion."). 
262. LEITER, supra note 2, at 101 n.12. 
263. /d. at 33-35. 
264. Nelson Tebbe, for example, in studying nonbelievers describes the subject of study as 
follows in a section entitled Who Are Nonbelievers?: "When I refer to nonbelievers 
here, I mean to include people who take negative or skeptical positions on the 
existence of superhuman beings and supernatural powers." Tebbe, supra note 225, at 
1117. But Tebbe states that this is not a definition. !d. at 1117 n.21. There are many 
definitions of religion, only some of which begin with the supernatural or the 
superhuman. !d. at 1134 & n.102. 
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VI. THE VIETNAM DRAFT CASES 
There is a good reason why Professor Paulsen referred to, and 
criticized, the Vietnam War draft cases in his argument for a 
narrowly defmed religious foundation for religious liberty.265 For in 
those cases, United States v. Seeger/66 Welsh v. United States/67 and 
Gillette v. United States, 268 the Supreme Court set forth a very 
inclusive understanding of the meaning and scope of religious 
belief.269 It is this inclusive vision that some traditional religious 
believers object to as a threat to the protection of genuine religious 
liberty.270 
Seeger is probably the most thorough exploration of theology that 
the Supreme Court has ever undertaken. The context of the case 
concerned three claimants of conscientious objector status during the 
Vietnam draft era: Daniel Seeger, Arno Jakobson, and Forest Peter.271 
Congress had broadened the draft exemption statute to include 
persons who "by reason of [their] religious training and belief, [are] 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."272 
Religious training and belief were defmed in the Act as "an 
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties 
superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not 
include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code."273 While the three claimants 
challenged the constitutionality of this definition as excluding the 
nonbeliever and some religious believers, Peter and Jakobson also 
265. See Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1196. 
266. 380 u.s. 163 (1965). 
267. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
268. 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
269. See id. at 450-51 (stating that, when raising an objection to military service on the 
grounds of "religious training and belief," there is no requirement of a "particular 
sectarian affiliation or theological position"); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340 (finding that 
petitioner was entitled to a conscientious exemption under the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act because petitioner's beliefs, albeit unorthodox, "function[ed] 
as a religion in his life"); Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176, 183-84 (constructing the term 
"religious training and belief' in the Universal Military Training and Service Act, to 
include beliefs that are not traditional beliefs in God). 
270. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66 (holding that a person may be exempted under the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act by having a belief "that is sincere and 
meaningful" which "occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled 
by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."); 
Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1203. 
271. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 1~9. 
272. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456G) (1958). 
273. !d.; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 
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claimed that their beliefs met the statutory definition.274 The Court 
held in a unanimous opinion by Justice Clark, one later repudiated by 
Justice Harlan,275 that all three claimants met the statutory definition, 
thus avoiding any constitutional issue.276 
Justice Clark first held that Congress had not intended to distinguish 
between theistic and nontheistic religious beliefs: by using the term 
Supreme Being rather than God, Congress had intended "to embrace all 
religions."277 And Congress had, further, not restricted the scope of 
religion that could ground a legitimate application for conscientious 
objector status.278 The proper test of religion for purposes of the statute 
"is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a 
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox 
belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."279 
As became clear later in the opinion, the reason the Justices felt 
they could not distinguish between traditional theism and non-theism 
was the broad interpretation that modem theology applies to the 
meaning of God.280 Justice Clark concluded that God does not just 
mean the orthodox God, but "the broader concept of a power or 
being, or a faith, 'to which all else is subordinate or upon which all 
else is ultimately dependent. "'281 And the reason that religion tends 
to be defined so generously is that, for Justice Clark, religion is that 
realm of experience "dealing with the fundamental questions of 
man's predicament in life."282 
The opinion's broad approach to defming religious belief for 
purposes of conscientious objector status was said to "embrace[] the 
ever-broadening understanding of the modem religious 
community."283 Justice Clark quoted the theologian Paul Tillich, 
Bishop John Robinson, Vatican II, and, perhaps most revealingly for 
a broad definition of religion, David Muzzey, "a leader in the Ethical 
Culture Movement."284 For Muzzey, "[e]verybody except the 
[comparatively few] avowed atheists . . . believes in some kind of 
274. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 
275. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
276. See Matthew G. Lindenbaum, Religious Conscientious Objection and the 
Establishment Clause in the Rehnquist Court: Seeger, Welsh, Gillette, and § 6(j) 
Revisited, 36 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 237, 242-43 (2003). 
277. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 
278. !d. at 176. 
279. !d. at 165-66. 
280. See id. at 180-83. 
281. !d. at 174 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
282. /d. 
283. !d. at 180. 
284. !d. at 180-82. 
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God . . . . "285 Justice Clark had previously noted in the opinion that 
"[n]o party claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on this 
ground. "286 In a similar tone, the opinion quoted Tillich as referring 
to the God above the God of theism, "the seriousness of that doubt in 
which meaning within meaninglessness is affirmed"287 
What can we learn about the nature of religion from the Tillich 
quotation about "meaning within meaninglessness?"288 The 
challenge for the Western nonbeliever is that without the personal, 
supernatural, creator God of the Bible-what Justice Clark 
presumably meant by the "orthodox belief in God"289 and what 
Justice Scalia would later denominate "the God of monotheism" in 
the McCreary County Ten Commandments case290-the nonbeliever 
struggles to justify the belief that anything whatever is of real value. 
If everything is a cosmic accident, without plan or guiding 
intelligence and purpose, then is not everything meaningless? To put 
this another way, the nonbeliever can obviously be good without 
God, as the humanist chaplain Greg Epstein argues,291 but can a 
nonbeliever be good without objective good? 
What Tillich is suggesting, and apparently the Court agreed with 
him, is that the faith that there is meaning in existence is one way of 
describing belief in God itself.292 Many people who count themselves 
as nonbelievers could legitimately be considered religious, and 
indeed could even be considered believers in God, for purposes of the 
statute and for other purposes as well. The marker of religious belief 
thus becomes a commitment to sincere and serious, in the sense of 
demanding, moral realism, just as suggested in this article. 
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Seeger pointed to Hinduism and 
Buddhism to illustrate the breadth of the concept of a Supreme 
Being. 293 He concluded that the words Supreme Being should be 
construed to "include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic 
entity."294 To attribute to Congress a narrow, parochial view of the 
285. /d. at 182 (quoting DAVIDS. MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION 86-87 (1st ed. 1951)). 
286. /d. at 173. 
287. /d. at 180 (quoting 2 PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: EXISTENCE AND THE 
CHRIST 12 (1957)). 
288. /d. 
289. /d. at 166. 
290. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
291. GREG M. EPSTEIN, GOOD WITHOUT Goo: WHAT A BILLION NONRELIGIOUS PEOPLE DO 
BELIEVE, at X (2009). 
292. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180, 184, 186-88. 
293. /d. at 189 (Douglas J., concurring). 
294. /d. at 188. 
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term Supreme Being would create constitutional difficulties because 
Congress would be favoring one religious faith over another.295 
Douglas noted, as did the majority opinion, that none of the claimants 
"comes to us an avowedly irreligious person or as an atheist."296 
Since there is no longer a draft, we do not have to be concerned 
with the legitimate question of whether the Court was playing fast 
and loose with the statute in Seeger. 297 At one point in the opinion, 
Justice Clark even appears to misstate the wording of Section 6(j).298 
The point for our purposes is not whether the statute was fairly 
interpreted, but what it means to be religious. Christopher Hitchens 
is a good example of someone who believed passionately that human 
life was meaningful despite not believing in God;299 Sam Harris, 
another of the New Atheists, in his recent book about the reality of 
good and evil, The Moral Landscape, is another.300 Such persons can 
be viewed as religious from the point of view of the definition in 
Seeger because they affirm meaning within meaninglessness. 
Of course, Seeger was not the last word in the line of draft cases.301 
Congress amended the statute two years after the Seeger opinion to 
remove reference to the words "Supreme Being" as defining the 
meaning of religious training and belief.3°2 As Louis Fisher put it, 
"what the Court in effect deleted, Congress deleted in fact."303 This 
295. See id. 
296. !d. at 193. 
297. See Major William D. Palmer, Time to Exorcise Another Ghost From the Vietnam 
War: Restructuring the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L. REv. 
179, 200-01 (1993); R. Norman Moody, After 40 Years, Return of Military Draft Not 
in Sight, FL. TODAY, July 23, 2013, 
http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20 130723/NEWSO 11307230013/1 006/rssO 1/ After 
-40-years-return-military-draft-not-sight. 
298. See Palmer, supra note 297, at 200 ("Early in the opinion, Justice Clark gave an 
indication of the care with which he intended to treat the words and intent of Congress 
when he substituted the word 'economic' for 'philosophical' in the statute's list of 
beliefs that would not qualify for the exemption."). 
299. See generally HiTCHENS, supra note 132 (arguing that religion is man-made and that 
human decency is not derived from religion). 
300. See SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE: How SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE HUMAN 
VALUES 2 (2010); Simon Hooper, The Rise of the 'New Atheists', CNN (Nov. 9, 2006 
10:06 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/08/atheism.feature/index.html. 
301. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1970). 
302. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165 (majority opinion); compare Military Selective Service 
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 7, 81 Stat. 100, 104 (1967) (omitting "Supreme Being" from 
the Act), with Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958) 
(including "Supreme Being" in the Act). 
303. Louis Fisher, Nonjudicial Safeguards for Religious Liberty, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 31, 58 
(2001). 
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change did not figure directly in the Court's next case, Welsh, but on 
the other hand, the statutory change must have been viewed by some 
of the Justices as supportive of the general approach in Seeger, an 
approach upon which the Welsh plurality relied to an overwhelming 
degree.304 
In Welsh, there was no majority to reaffirm the Seeger language.305 
Only three other Justices-Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall-joined 
Justice Black's plurality opinion.306 Justice Harlan concurred in the 
result, expressly repudiating his vote in Seeger,307 and three Justices 
dissented: Justice White joined by Justice Stewart and Chief Justice 
Burger.308 The decision to dissent by Justices White and Stewart, 
along with the concurrence by Justice Harlan, indicated that three of 
the original votes in Seeger either now disagreed with that approach 
or were at least unwilling to reaffirm it.309 
For Justice Black, Welsh essentially was Seeger, so no expansion 
of the approach taken in Seeger was necessary to reverse Welsh's 
conviction for refusing to be inducted: 
The controlling facts in this case are strikingly similar 
to those in Seeger. Both Seeger and Welsh were 
brought up in religious homes and attended church in 
their childhood, but in neither case was this church 
one which taught its members not to engage in war at 
any time for any reason. Neither Seeger nor Welsh 
continued his childhood religious ties into his young 
manhood, and neither belonged to any religious group 
or adhered to the teachings of any organized religion 
during the period of his involvement with the 
Selective Service System. At the time of registration 
for the draft, neither had yet come to accept pacifist 
principles. Their views on war developed only in 
subsequent years, but when their ideas did fully 
mature both made application to their local draft 
304. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185-86. 
305. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335, 344 (5-3 decision) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
306. See id. at 335. 
307. See id. at 344-45. 
308. See id. at 367 (White, J., dissenting). 
309. Justice White's dissent indicated scant support for Seeger: "Whether or not United 
States v. Seeger . . . accurately reflected the intent of Congress in providing draft 
exemptions for religious conscientious objectors to war, I cannot join today's 
construction ofs 6(j) .... " !d. at 367 (citation omitted). 
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boards for conscientious objector exemptions from 
military service under s 6(j) of the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act. ... 
[Vol. 43 
In filling out their exemption applications both Seeger 
and Welsh were unable to sign the statement that, as 
printed in the Selective Service form, stated 'I am, by 
reason of my religious training and belief, 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form.' Seeger could sign only after striking the words 
'training and' and putting quotation marks around the 
word 'religious.' Welsh could sign only after striking 
the words, 'my religious training and.' On those same 
applications, neither could defmitely affirm nor deny 
that he believed in a 'Supreme Being,' both stating 
that they preferred to leave the question open. But 
both Seeger and Welsh affirmed on those applications 
that they held deep conscientious scruples against 
taking part in wars where people were killed. Both 
strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, 
unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade 
them to take part in such an evil practice. Their 
objection to participating in war in any form could not 
be said to come from a 'still, small voice of 
conscience'; rather, for them that voice was so loud 
and insistent that both men preferred to go to jail 
rather than serve in the Armed Forces. There was 
never any question about the sincerity and depth of 
Seeger's convictions as a conscientious objector, and 
the same is true of Welsh. 310 
Justice Black rejected the attempt by the government to distinguish 
Welsh from Seeger on the grounds first, that Welsh was more 
insistent than Seeger that his views were not religious and second, 
that Welsh's views were essentially political, sociological, or 
philosophical or constituted a merely personal moral code, which the 
statute expressly forbade as a basis for exemption.311 As to the first 
ground, Justice Black reasoned that an applicant for exemption might 
not be familiar with "the broad scope of the word 'religious' as used 
in s 6(j)," and in any event, Welsh had written a letter to the Appeal 
310. Id. at 335-37 (majority opinion). 
311. See id. at 341-43. 
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Board stating that "his beliefs were 'certainly religious in the ethical 
sense of the word. "'312 As to the second ground, Justice Black 
admitted that these factors did influence Welsh, as they had Seeger, 
but the exclusion applied only to applicants for exemption whose 
views do not rest "at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but 
instead rest solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or 
expediency."313 
As the above quote suggests, Justice Black's approach did in fact 
broaden the formula in Seeger by its emphasis on the moral and 
ethical as grounds of religious belief. The test of exemption for 
Justice Black in Welsh was stated as follows: 
What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's 
conscientious oojection to all war to be 'religious" 
within the meaning of s 6G) is that this opposition to 
war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or 
religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and 
that these beliefs be held with the strength of 
traditional religious convictions.314 
As shown above, the actual Seeger test did not mention the moral or 
ethical as permitted sources for religious views independent of 
religion itself.315 The test applied in Seeger used the word "belief'' 
without indicating any source.316 By using the words moral and 
ethical, in addition to the word religious, to describe the kind of belief 
that could ground the exemption, Justice Black was theoretically 
permitting claimants to deny that they were religious and to claim 
that their pacifism was rooted in morality and ethics, not religion. 317 
However, this expansion of the test for religion was not the reason 
Justice Harlan rejected the statutory test in Seeger that he had earlier 
supported.318 While Justice Harlan did note that the plurality now 
allowed "beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source" to qualify 
for the exemption, and that this approach eliminated the statutory 
requirement of a religious content for the exemption,319 he stated, in 
312. Id. at 341. 
313. !d. at 342-43. 
314. !d. at 339-40. 
315. See id. at 339 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)). 
316. !d. (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176). 
317. See id. at 339-40. 
318. See id. at 344-54 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
319. !d. at 345. 
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obvious criticism, that the Court in Seeger had earlier "embrac[ ed] a 
secular definition of religion" that conflicted with Congress' 
language and intent. 320 
Why, then, did Justice Harlan concur in the reversal of Welsh's 
conviction? Justice Harlan was of the view that Congress had made 
two distinctions, both of which violated the Constitution. First, 
Congress recognized only conscientious objection grounded on 
religion, as opposed to "secular beliefs."321 That choice violated the 
Establishment Clause.322 Second, Congress distinguished between 
theistic and nontheistic religion, which also violated the 
Establishment Clause. 323 
What was the difference for Justice Harlan between religious 
beliefs and the "inner ethical voice that bespeaks secular and not 
'religious' reflection"324 that Congress had unconstitutionally 
excluded from the statutory exemption? Justice Harlan never clearly 
distinguished the secular from the religious, but he did note that, to be 
constitutional, the statute must include exemption for beliefs that 
"emanate from a purely moral, ethical or philosophical source" 
(which the statute expressly excluded) and must be religiously neutral 
in the sense that it includes "conscience" as a basis for its 
application. 325 
Justice Harlan's views on the meaning of religion are nuanced. He 
did distinguish religious reasons from secular reasons and was of the 
view that to benefit the former and not the latter would violate the 
Establishment Clause as not religiously neutral.326 On the other hand, 
he was willing to live with the expansion of the term religious in the 
Welsh plurality to include both religious and secular grounds for 
pacifism even though this definition still excluded some people 
opposed to all war-those opposed to war on grounds of 
pragmatism.327 That exclusion from conscientious objector status did 
not violate the Establishment Clause for Justice Harlan.328 
320. /d. at 353. 
321. !d. at 356. 
322. See id. at 356-57. 
323. See id. 
324. /d. at 357. 
325. !d. at 358 & n.9. 
326. See id. at 356 (explaining that were Congress to "draw the line between theistic and 
nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other," such 
distinctions would not be compatible with the Establishment Clause). 
327. /d. at 359 n.IO. 
328. !d. 
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Justice White's dissent took issue with the plurality on grounds 
similar to those of Justice Harlan-that the plurality had not followed 
the text and intention behind the statutory exemption.329 The dissent 
took issue with Justice Harlan, however, concerning whether 
exempting only religious grounds for objection to war violates the 
Establishment Clause and whether, even if it did, this infirmity 
should result in extending the statutory exemption to a nonreligious 
objector such as Welsh. 
The third case of what are usually considered the Vietnam draft 
trilogy is Gillette, which raised the issue of conscientious objection to 
a particular war-in this case the Vietnam War.330 The claimants in 
Gillette were Guy Gillette, whose views were "based on a humanist 
approach to religion," and who was convicted for failure to report for 
induction, and Louis Negre, "a devout Catholic," who was relying on 
a "just" war theory and who sought habeas corpus for discharge after 
induction and orders to report to Vietnam.331 Justice Marshall noted 
that, in both instances, there was no doubt about the sincerity or 
religious character of the claimants' objections to the Vietnam 
War.332 
Justice Marshall's majority opinion first rejected arguments that the 
statutory exemption reaches conscientious objector to a particular 
war.333 Not surprisingly, given the text, the Court ruled that it did 
not. 334 
The more significant argument was that the statute, construed as 
applying only to the conscientious objection to all wars, violates "the 
religious clauses of the First Amendment."335 Justice Marshall 
interpreted the challenge as primarily an Establishment Clause issue 
that Congress was "impermissibly discriminat[ing] among types of 
religious belief and affiliation. "336 
Justice Marshall admitted that insofar as the claimants' beliefs in 
Gillette were religious, the nature of their religious beliefs was the 
329. See id. at 367 (White, J., dissenting) ("I cannot join today's construction of § 6(j) 
extending draft exemption to those who disclaim religious objections to war and 
whose views about war represent a purely personal code arising not from religious 
training and belief as the statute requires but from readings in philosophy, history, and 
sociology."). 
330. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,439 (1971) . 
. 331. !d. at 439-41 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
332. !d. at 440. 
333. See id. at 447. 
334. See id. 
335. !d. at 448. 
336. !d. at 449. 
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reason their claims failed while other, different religious beliefs 
qualified for conscientious objector status.337 But the statutory 
restriction of conscientious objector status to objection to all war 
rather than particular wars is religiously neutral, as required by the 
Establishment Clause. There was no violation because the distinction 
Congress used-selective objection versus objection to war in any 
form-does not itself distinguish among religious beliefs. 338 The 
distinction pointed to by the claimants is a "de facto discrimination" 
because some religions permit participation in just wars only.339 
While that does not automatically undermine the constitutional 
challenge, the existence of valid secular purposes for the 
Congressional policy recognizing conscientious objector status for 
objectors to all wars and for limiting that exemption to just that 
orientation are sufficient to uphold the statute against such a de facto 
challenge.340 The main justification for the limit is the interest in 
fairness and the danger of erratic or discriminatory decisions if 
opposition to particular wars were permitted to ground the 
conscientious objector classification.341 The objection to particular 
wars is ultimately subjective.342 
The claimants also raised a Free Exercise claim that "conscripting 
persons who oppose a particular war on grounds of conscience and 
religion" violates the Constitution.343 Here Justice Marshall found the 









The conscription laws, applied to such persons as to 
others, are not designed to interfere with any religious 
ritual or practice, and do not work a penalty against 
any theological position. The incidental burdens felt 
by persons in petitioners' position are strictly justified 
by substantial governmental interests that relate 
directly to the very impacts questioned. And more 
broadly, of course, there is the Government's interest 
in procuring the manpower necessary for military 
purposes, pursuant to the constitutional grant of power 
to Congress to raise and support armies. Art. I, s 8.344 
See id. at 449-50. 
See id. at 450--51. 
!d. at 451-52. 
See id. at 452-53. 
See id. at 455. 
See id. at 456. 
!d. at 461. 
!d. at 462. 
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The Justices in Gillette were not unanimous.345 Justice Black 
concurred in the judgment and joined only Part I of the opinion-the 
rejection of the statutory claim.346 Justice Douglas dissented, but 
agreed with the Court that selective objection does not meet the 
statutory definition of conscientious objection. 347 
In terms of the understanding of what it means to be religious, 
Gillette is mixed. Though the issue was not before the Court, neither 
the majority opinion nor any other opinion in the case questioned 
whether Gillette's "humanist approach to religion" qualified as 
religious for purposes of the statutory exemption. Both Gillette and 
Negre (who was raising religious claims specifically under his 
Catholic religious training) were permitted to question whether the 
statute could be interpreted to reach their claims of objection to 
particular wars.348 
On the other hand, in discussing the Free Exercise challenge to the 
statute, the majority only made the "assumption" that Gillette's and 
Negre's "beliefs concerning war have roots that are 'religious' in 
nature within the meaning of the Amendment as well as this Court's 
decisions construing s 6(j)" rather than holding that they did.349 This 
reservation; if that is what it was, would have been aimed at Gillette 
rather than Negre, since obviously Roman Catholic teachings are 
religious by any definition. 
In addition, Justice Douglas, in dissenting from the Free Exercise 
holding, distinguished carefully between Negre and Gillette.350 
Justice Douglas would have upheld both their claims of conscientious 
objection to particular wars.351 But Justice Douglas' conclusion with 
regard to Negre was straightforward: "Negre is opposed under his 
religious training and beliefs to participation in any form in the war in 
Vietnam."352 In contrast, for the humanist Gillette, the route to the 
same conclusion was more contorted: 
It is true that the First Amendment speaks of the free 
exercise of religion, not of the free exercise of 
345. See id. at 463,470 (8-1 decision). 
346. See id. at 441, 447,463. 
347. See id. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
348. See id. at 439-41 (majority opinion). 
349. Id. at 449. 
350. See id. at 463-75 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
351. Id. at 463, 470,475. 
352. Id. at 475. 
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conscience or belief. Yet conscience and belief are the 
main ingredients of First Amendment rights. They are 
the bedrock of free speech as well as religion. The 
implied First Amendment right of "conscience" 1s 
certainly as high as the "right of association" ... 
[Vol. 43 
Conscience is often the echo of religious faith. But, as this case 
illustrates, it may also be the product of travail, meditation, or sudden 
revelation related to a moral apprehension of the dimensions of a 
problem, not to a religion in the ordinary sense. 353 So, Justice 
Douglas perhaps did not regard the defmition of religion to be as 
broad as did the majority opinion in Seeger that he had joined. 
Something in Gillette's beliefs called forth from him a distinction 
between religion and conscience that those of Seeger did not. 
Before concluding this section concerning the approach of the 
Supreme Court, I need to address the claim sometimes put forth that 
the Justices narrowed their understanding of religion from the breadth 
exhibited in Seeger in Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972.354 In Yoder 
members of the Amish faith were convicted under Wisconsin's 
compulsory school attendance statute for refusing to send their 
children to school beyond the eighth grade.355 They challenged their 
convictions on the ground that their free exercise rights were 
violated.356 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, did not 
specify a definition of religion, but stated "[t]hat the record in this 
case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of 
the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of 
deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and 
intimately related to daily living."357 Justice Burger examined the 
belief of the Amish that salvation requires living separate and apart 
from the influences of the modem world, based on a literal reading of 
the Apostle Paul's command, "be not conformed to this world . . . 
• "
358 The Yoder majority opinion did not mention the Seeger/Welsh 
definition ofreligion.359 In his dissent, Justice Douglas suggested that 
the majority opinion was contrary to Seeger/Welsh/60 which is 
undoubtedly why Yoder is sometimes read that way. 
353. !d. at 465-66. 
354. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
355. Id. at 207-08. 
356. See id. at 208-09. 
357. Jd. at 216. 
358. Jd. at 210, 216. 
359. Though Justice Harlan's opinion in Welsh was cited in Yoder. Jd. at 215 n.6. 
360. ld. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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But the dispute between Justice Douglas and Justice Burger is by 
no means clear. Here is the actual quote by Justice Burger and 
Justice Douglas' response: 
[W]e must be careful to determine whether the Amish 
religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, 
inseparable and interdependent. A way of life, 
however virtuous and admirable, may not be 
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of 
education if it is based on purely secular 
considerations; to have the protection of the Religion 
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. 
Although a determination of what is a "religious" 
belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection 
may present a most delicate question, the very concept 
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to 
make his own standards on matters of conduct m 
which society as a whole has important interests. 
Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of 
their subjective evaluation and rejection of the 
contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, 
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time 
and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims 
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice 
was philosophical and personal rather than religious, 
and such belief does not rise to the demands of the 
Religion Clauses.361 
Now, the first question we might ask is whether Thoreau would 
disagree with Justice Burger. Thoreau was no fan of what we 
ordinarily call conscience, though he might have agreed that his 
choices were personal and philosophical and not religious.362 
361. !d. at 215-16 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted). 
362. Here is an excerpt from the poem At/an tides: 
Conscience is instinct bred in the house, 
Feeling and Thinking propagate the sin 
By an unnatural breeding in and in. 
I say, Tum it out doors, 
Into the moors. 
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, ATLANTIDES, reprinted in HENRY DAVID THOREAU: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS AND POEMS 615 (Elizabeth Hall Witherell ed., 2001 ). 
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In response to Justice Burger, Justice Douglas quoted from the 
Seeger opinion-pointing to the "place parallel to that filled by the 
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption" language to 
try to show that Justice Burger had improperly narrowed the 
definition of religion.363 Suffice it to say that this exchange did not 
settle anything. Justice Burger did not repudiate the Seeger opinion's 
language and the application of that language to Thoreau presents a 
nice question that tossed off dicta on either side could not resolve. 
The place we end up from this short examination of case law is not 
another attempt to define religion as such. Rather it is this: the Court 
in this series of cases allows for a distinction between the secular and 
the religious, particularly as the religious serves as a ground for 
fundamental opposition to the policies of the state. Insofar as that 
opposition rests on a personal judgment weighing policy values 
differently from the balance set by the majority, there is nothing 
religious; there is merely the stuff of winning and losing in politics 
itself. 
But insofar as that opposition rests on a different level of personal 
identity that the person experiences as compulsive rather than chosen, 
whether that compulsion is experienced from the outside or the 
inside, the objector may be said to stand in religious opposition to the 
state. That compulsion is grounded in the objective reality of 
meaning, which is why religion is never a matter of choice. As 
Douglas Laycock puts it: 
[t]he nontheist's belief in transcendent moral 
obligations-in obligations that transcend his self-
interest and his personal preferences and which he 
experiences as so strong that he has no choice but to 
comply-is analogous to the transcendent moral 
obligations that are part of the cluster of theistic 
beliefs that we recognize as religious.364 
My only hesitance regarding Laycock's statement is that calling 
this a nontheistic belief may confuse the issue. The belief in 
transcendent obligations reaches all the way to many persons 
conventionally thought of, and often self-described as, nonbelievers. 
They are to be considered religious as well. 
363. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)). 
364. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 336 
(1996). 
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In none of these cases is there a requirement of belief in a personal 
God or a supernatural realm before one can be considered religious. 
In none of these cases is there a requirement of a body of fellow 
practitioners or a regimen of ceremonial customs. Nor is there a 
requirement of texts. What there is, is the sense that one's identity is 
at risk and at stake in the felt obligation at issue. Not every religion 
functions as commandment. But every religious belief makes 
demands. 
The Pro-Religion Equality Project provides an overall 
understanding of the relationship between conscience claims by 
traditional religious believers and conscience claims by persons who 
are not a part Of traditional religion. The Vietnam Draft cases 
manifest that understanding, or something like it, and set forth a 
framework for applying that understanding in the context of broadly 
interpreted religious exemption provisions. Before discussing 
objections to that framework in Part VII, it is necessary to consider 
briefly the alternative to broadly interpreted religious exemption 
provisions: conscience clauses that also provide for exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. 
VII. THE LIMITATIONS OF CONSCIENCE CLAUSES 
The fundamental objection to the Vietnam draft cases, on both 
sides, is that the cases defmed religion too broadly. From the 
nonbeliever side, the harm of such a defmition, aside from the fact 
that it is in some sense false, is that it includes nonbelievers in a 
realm that they may sincerely reject. 365 We are not religious, 
nonbelievers might say. 
From the believer side, the broad understanding of religion may not 
only be false to their understanding of their own position and of 
reality, but may devalue the stakes involved in considering religion 
and religious exemptions from the commands of the state.366 Broad 
definitions of religion inevitably dilute religious liberty claims by 
allowing other kinds of claims to be raised. 367 They are not religious, 
believers might say. 
In principle, each side might simply reject recognition of the need 
for any exemptions from the commands of the state. For the 
365. See supra notes 129-51 and accompanying text. 
366. See Donald L. Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Narrow 
Definition of Religion?, 39 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 357, 372-73 (2011) (describing the 
fear that a broad definition of religion could lead to insincere requests for 
exemptions). 
367. /d. 
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nonbeliever, the state's command might be morally wrong, but the 
answer to that would be some form of struggle against it. For the 
believer, the state's command might controvert religious truth, but 
the answer would be martyrdom. These responses are not entirely 
different from each other. 
In practice, however, that has not been the position of believers or 
nonbelievers. Historically, nonbelievers have been willing to 
recognize religious exemptions to some extent, which is why 
Congress passed the RFRA practically unanimously.368 Recently, 
however, as described above, nonbelievers have been arguing that 
religious exemptions per se are unjustified and discriminatory.369 
Conscience exemptions, available to all, should be substituted. 
Donald Beschle takes this position, for example.370 Leiter takes this 
position, but then really argues against all exemptions from generally 
applicable law.371 
Believers have also historically favored religious exemptions.372 In 
response to the challenge by nonbelievers to religious exemptions, 
some believers have argued that religious claims to exemption are 
different from those of secular conscience.373 Professor Paulsen takes 
that position, for example.374 That does not necessarily mean that 
such believers oppose conscience clauses, only that they want 
religious exemptions to be treated separately. Of course, such 
believers may suspect that even differentiated conscience clauses 
would inevitably dilute claims of strictly religious liberty. 
What I hope to show in this Part is that, contra to some 
nonbelievers, conscience clauses should not be added to religious 
exemptions or substituted for them, and therefore the claims of 
nonbelievers for exemption should be included within religious 
liberty claims, as occurred in the draft cases above. The objections of 
believers to that proposal will be taken up in the next Part. 
Let me illustrate the problem of robust conscience clauses, by 
which I mean conscience clauses that will actually exempt some 
368. See Ledewitz, Experimenting with Religious Liberty, supra note 113, (describing 
adoption of the RFRA). 
369. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text. 
370. See Beschle, supra note 366, at 390. 
371. See LEITER, supra note 2, at 93-104. 
372. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972) (seeking a religious 
exemption from having to comply with a compulsory school attendance statute as the 
law is contrary to Amish values). 
373. See Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1203-{)4 (explaining that religious obligations are 
different from moral belief systems that have no concept of God). 
374. !d. 
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claimants despite the burden this may sometimes place on others and 
despite the harms that exemptions may create, by contrasting the Air 
Force yarmulke case, Goldman v. Weinberger375 with conscience 
exemptions from mandatory child vaccination laws. I am not 
claiming to have exhausted all the different ways that either religious 
exemptions or conscience clauses can be conceptualized or can 
operate. What follows is a brief attempt to set forth one kind of 
contrast-that is, one way that religious exemptions can be contrasted 
with conscience clauses. 
In Goldman, an Air Force regulation mandating uniform dress for 
Air Force personnel was applied to a rabbi, thereby preventing him 
from wearing a yarmulke, a religious requirement for Orthodox Jews 
under certain circumstances.376 The Air Force was enforcing a 
"strong interest in discipline," rather than any form of religious 
discrimination,377 and there was no question of the sincerity of 
Goldman's religious practice. In a situation like this, the 
government's interest is entirely valid, but the weight of that interest 
falls vastly disproportionately on religious minorities whose interests 
in this context the majority is unlikely to value fairly.378 In other 
words, religious liberty functions here similarly to the way that Equal 
Protection law and other anti-discrimination principles function for 
other types of minorities. 379 
Importantly, Goldman was not implicitly cntlctzmg the 
government's interest or its practice of uniformity regarding everyone 
else. He was not attempting to reweigh a policy result. While the 
Court rejected Goldman's claim, the reason stated was the unusual 
necessity of not forcing the military to make exceptions to its uniform 
discipline policy, not necessarily rejecting this kind of claim in all 
future contexts.380 
Much of the Free Exercise case law can be viewed in similar 
fashion: not wishing to work on a day that is not the Sabbath for most 
people or the use of a forbidden substance for ceremonial purposes 
and so forth. The interest of the individual in maintaining the 
375. 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986). 
376. !d. at 504--05. 
377. /d. at 504. Actually, reading between the lines, there seemed to be evidence that 
enforcement of the Air Force regulation amounted to illegal retaliation, a point that 
did not escape Justice Stevens' concurrence. /d. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
378. See id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
379. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARv. L. REv. 747, 764-65 
(20 II) (comparing equal protection and free exercise jurisprudence). 
380. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10 (majority opinion). 
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religious practice is very great compared to the government's interest 
in uniform enforcement of an otherwise valid policy and is of a 
different nature than is the government's interest in universal 
enforcement.381 There is harm from granting an exemption, but that 
harm can sometimes be outweighed by the interest of the claimant. 382 
Now, in contrast, consider the various forms of exemptions from 
mandatory child vaccination laws. Three types of exemptions to 
mandatory vaccination laws are typical: medical and religious, which 
are practically universal among the states, and philosophical, which 
are less common:383 
Virtually all states ... grant religious exemptions for 
persons who have sincere religious beliefs in 
opposition to immunization. Some statutes require 
parents to disclose their religion, while others are 
more liberally worded. A minority of states also grant 
exemptions for parents that profess philosophical 
convictions in opposition to immunization. These 
statutes allow parents to object to vaccination because 
of their "personal," "moral," or "other" beliefs. 384 
According to Nancy Berlinger of the Hastings Center, these 
exemptions operate as follows: medical exemptions apply to children 
with medical conditions that weaken their immune systems, "making 
routine immunizations risky"; religious exemptions apply to religious 
practices such as a belief in "faith healing"; but the nonmedical, 
nonreligious exemption claims tend to be by parents who: 
have strong personal beliefs about the dangers of 
vaccines; in particular, the belief that certain 
childhood vaccines are linked to rising rates of autism. 
This claim has been the subject of several studies by 
the Institute of Medicine, which concluded that there 
is no scientifically credible evidence to support it. But 
two recent cases involving children with 
mitochondrial disorders who became seriously ill 
following vaccination-one child became autistic and 
381. See id. at 523-24 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
382. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (holding that the Amish 
interest in religious practices outweighs the state's interest in compulsory education). 
383. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: 
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 873-74 (2002). 
384. /d. at 874. 
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the other died-have reinforced fears about 
immunization. 385 
Parents who fear immunization for safety reasons are usually 
reweighing a policy decision that the majority, through expert 
evidence, have decided differently.386 The majority have decided that 
immunization either does not cause harm or causes harm so 
infrequently that the public health benefits of universal immunization 
outweigh the risk. The minority that disagree with this judgment 
have no special interest that the majority are likely to ignore. Many 
of the voters who support universal immunization have children of 
their own and are exceedingly unlikely to downplay the threat of 
immunization to their own children. 
The vaccination context, therefore, reflects an unusual political 
situation in which the losers in a purely political struggle concerning 
ordinary evaluations of consequences are permitted to opt out of the 
requirements of a law. As strongly as some parents may feel about 
vaccinations, this disagreement does not rise to the level of 
conscience, as that term is usually understood-"'a sincere 
conviction about what is morally required or forbidden. "'387 Granting 
parents a conscience exemption under these circumstances is not 
much different from allowing wealthy taxpayers to give themselves a 
tax cut because they sincerely believe that lower taxes will lead to 
economic growth and that higher taxes will harm everyone. 
385. Nancy Berlinger, Conscience Clauses, Health Care Providers, and Parents, in From 
Birth to Death and Bench to Clinic: The Hastings Center Bioethics Briefing Book for 
Journalists, Policymakers, and Campaigns, HASTINGS CTR. 37 (2008), 
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Briefing_Book/conscien 
ce%20clauses%20chapter.pdf. 
386. !d. It is true that there could be other moral and ethical reasons for opposing 
vaccination, such as the treatment of animals in the production and research of the 
vaccine, but this is not typically the issue motivating parents. See also PAUL A. OFFIT, 
DEADLY CHOICES: How THE ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT THREATENS Us ALL 121-22 
(2011) (explaining that some anti-vaccine protestors argue that vaccinations are 
unchristian in that two human cell strains taken from aborted fetuses have been used 
to create vaccines); cf Art Caplan, Bioethicist: US Children Suffer from Vaccine 
Exemptions, NBC NEWS (July 31, 2012, 8:29 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/health/bioethicist-us-children-suffer-vaccine-exemptions-
917155 (opting out of vaccinations has become increasingly easy, as states accept 
exemptions due to religion or other personal or philosophical reasons). 
387. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 CARDOZO 
L. REv. 1389, 1395 (2012) (quoting Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for 
Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 325, 328 (2005)). 
66 University of Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 43 
I am not suggesting that vaccination conscience exemptions are a 
bad policy; it may be that so many parents would resist vaccination 
that law enforcement would collapse if a truly mandatory vaccination 
policy were implemented. But I am suggesting that conscience 
exemptions, in general, allow losers in a political struggle to reweigh 
policy differences, threatening the breakdown of democratic 
decision-making. Therefore, religious exemptions are a vast 
improvement over conscience exemptions. 
I know of one example of my argument in practice. Allegheny 
County, where I live, has adopted exemptions to its Health 
Department Mandatory Vaccination Regulations that combine 
traditional religious and conscience provisions: 
1004. EXEMPTION FOR IMMUNIZATION. 
A. Medical Exemption. Children need not be 
immunized if a physician or his/her designee provides 
a written Statement that immunization may be 
detrimental to the health of the child. When the physi-
cian determines that immunization is no longer 
detrimental to the health of the child, the child shall be 
immunized according to this subchapter. 
B. Religious Exemption. Children need not be 
immunized if the parent, guardian, or emancipated 
child objects in writing to the immunization on 
religious grounds or on the basis of a strong moral or 
ethical conviction similar to a religious belief. 388 
The exemption is denominated "religious," but includes "a strong 
moral or ethical conviction similar to a religious belief."389 This 
exemption is not very different from the Seeger approach to religious 
exemption, which included beliefs that were parallel to a traditional 
belief in God, and to the Welsh plurality, which distinguished among 
moral, ethical, and religious beliefs.390 
Undoubtedly, parents who believe vaccinations are dangerous to 
their children are going to use this religious exemption, just as 
parents in other states use broader conscience provisions. 
Nevertheless, Allegheny County has presumably concluded that the 
388. 28 PA. CODE§ 23.84(a}-{b) (2012). 
389. /d. § 23.84(b). 
390. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339, 342-43 (1970) (plurality opinion) (citing 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)). 
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use of the term "religious" will restrict mere policy disagreement to 
some extent-that it will serve as some sort of check on exemption 
claims.391 I think that judgment is justified. There is a difference 
between having to self-identify as having a religious objection and 
having only to assert a conscience objection. My proposal for 
religious exemptions in general would simply eliminate the words 
"moral or ethical" altogether and allow the reference to religion to be 
interpreted broadly to include moral and ethical commitments to the 
objectivity of values. 
Of course, some claimants will still utilize a religious exemption to 
enforce their policy disagreements with mandatory vaccination laws; 
however, others will respect a distinction between religious 
commitment and their own policy-based objections to vaccinations 
and will probably give in and follow the law. 
In the end, conscience clauses exacerbate all the problems that 
critics associate with broadly interpreted religious exemptions. 
Religious exemptions invite such widespread noncooperation with 
laws that they may prove impractical. But, at least religious 
exemptions restrict such non-cooperation to deep differences of 
values. Conscience clauses do that as well, but also invite 
noncooperation out of purely policy disagreements. They are, 
therefore, not an alternative to religious exemptions, unless-like 
Leiter--one anticipates that no or few exemptions will be actually be 
granted. 
VIII. OBJECTIONS TO THE PRO-RELIGION EQUALITY 
PROJECT'S EXPANSION OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
As seen above, the expansion of the reach of religious exemptions 
proposed here does not go all the way to a recognition of conscience. 
The claimant of a religious exemption must be willing to be 
described as religious and must fit within a definition of religion, 
even if that is an expanded definition. Donald Beschle has argued 
that such a result "begins to resemble an individual right of 
nullification."392 He has presented a constitutional interpretation to 
limit that result by treating religion broadly, yet applying a standard 
of less than the purported strict scrutiny associated with a pre-Smith 
regime and statutory exemptions like RFRA. 393 It seems to me the 
other way to limit that result is to retain the category of religion as the 
391. See 28 PA. CODE§ 23.84(a}-(b). 
392. Beschle, supra note 366, at 382. 
393. !d. at 382-83. 
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basis for exemption and to retain the structural limits on religion that 
Seeger put forth. 
But that structural limit is itself offensive to some on both sides of 
the religious-nonreligious divide. The objection by nonbelievers to 
being involuntarily included within religious exemptions was 
adverted to above: we are not religious. And, it may be added, we 
nonbelievers disagree that traditional religious claims of conscience 
and nonreligious claims of conscience share the common ground that 
the Pro-Religion Equality Project proposes. There is more to religion 
than moral realism. There are non-rational elements to religion to 
which we nonbelievers profoundly object. 
This objection on the part of some nonbelievers will be deeply felt. 
Opposition to, and separation from, traditional religion forms a deep 
part of the identity of such persons. There is something insulting 
about insisting to such a nonbeliever that her beliefs are "really 
religious." 
Nevertheless, the simple answer to this objection was already 
anticipated by Justice Black's plurality opinion in Welsh, discussed 
above.394 In resisting self-identification as religious, Welsh, Justice 
Black suggested, may simply not have understood the broad scope 
the word religion had been given in the Supreme Court's treatment of 
the draft exemption.395 We can reinterpret Justice Black's point as 
follows: an applicant for a religious exemption who hesitates to label 
herself as religious is making a philosophical claim about the nature 
of religion, rather than a legal argument. The defmition of religion, 
for purposes of an exemption statute or the Free Exercise Clause, is 
for the law to decide. If the law broadly interprets the word religion 
so that it fits many people who have nothing to do with traditional 
religion, the nonreligious claimant should have no hesitance in going 
forward with the exemption claim, including using the word religious 
to define the exemption claim. 
Of course, it is not only nonbelievers who object to having to resort 
to broad religious exemptions. 396 Some believers also object to the 
use of broad religious exemptions.397 Michael Paulsen argues that 
religious exemptions are only coherent when they are understood to 
rest on the claim that "true religious obligation is more important 
394. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341 (plurality opinion). 
395. See id. at 341-42. 
396. Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1188 n.51 (citing MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN 
AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GoVERNMENT IN AMERlCAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 15 (1965)). 
397. /d. 
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than civil obligation."398 And by true religious obligations, Paulsen 
means the assumption that God exists and that God's commands are 
made known to the believer.399 For Paulsen, religion in the 
exemption context must be theistic.400 
While I believe that Paulsen's account fails as an actual description 
of government granted religious exemptions from the law-and 
Paulsen might agree with that because he calls his account a theory of 
religious liberty and not a theory of government granted religious 
freedom401-I agree with him that for the believer, the commands of 
God are superior to those of the state. That is true by definition, but 
it is not important for our purposes. The believer does not need the 
state's permission to obey God rather than man. The believer is 
going to be willing to suffer almost any fate, and certainly any fate an 
American government would impose, rather than disobey God. 
I also agree with Paulsen that one can imagine some questions of 
religious practice over which the state may be presumed to be 
incompetent and over which the believer must be free to make his or 
her own judgments. An example of such a religious question would 
be how the mass is performed. In that kind of context, a theory of 
two separate realms-civil and religious-is coherent. Insofar as the 
framers of the Constitution accepted the two-realm theory, they 
undoubtedly had these kinds of issues in mind. 
But again, this concession does not implicate questions such as 
laws touching on abortion, contraception, vaccination, hallucinogenic 
drugs, and all the other areas in which the issue of religious 
exemptions actually arise. In these fields, government is not 
incompetent to legislate for the public good and is obviously not 
going to cede to the religious dissenter the right to decide on her own 
whether to obey the law. Therefore, exemptions will be a 
government policy rather than an inherent right of the believer. Even 
if something that could be considered an inherent right is granted, as 
some might consider the Free Exercise Clause to be, its protections 
will still ultimately be enforced by an agent of the state-a judge. 
Paulsen's understanding of religious exemptions fails to provide an 
adequate framework for two reasons: his notion of God is too narrow 
and his notion of transmission is too simple. Let me take the question 
of transmission first. Even if God exists and makes demands, the 
model of the believer bound by God rather than the state does not 
398. !d. at 1160. 
399. !d. at 1161, 1184 n.42. 
400. !d. at 1189. 
401. !d. at 1159-60. 
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describe the usual situation of an exemption claimant. This error is 
illustrated in the current controversy over the contraception mandate. 
There is nothing in Christian scripture prohibiting the use of 
contraceptives, which is why the official Roman Catholic position is 
relatively unique among American Christians.402 The interpretation 
comes about from a sophisticated interpretation based on an evolving 
tradition. Obviously I do not mean that it is for that reason a 
misinterpretation of the Gospel, only that it might be. In any event, 
the believer seeking a contraception exemption can be viewed as 
obeying men, that is, Church officials, rather than God directly. 
Church tradition rejects my conceptualization here because the 
Church's teaching authority itself is believed to be divinely 
inspired.403 The Church does not make the distinction that the Jewish 
tradition does in the Oven of Aknai story in which the human source 
of interpretation, in contradistinction to the divine, is actually 
celebrated.404 Nevertheless, the model utilized by Paulsen of the 
believer obeying God rather than the state is too simplistic. 
The other, and more problematic, issue for Paulsen is his 
understanding of God, the commands of God, and the nature of 
theism. For Paulsen, it is because God makes demands on believers 
that religious liberty requires the state to recognize religious 
exemptions from law.405 
It is common today for lawyers to claim to know who God is-
Justice Scalia, for example, asks confidently "what other God (in the 
singular, and with a capital G) there is, other than 'the God of 
monotheism. "'406 But I am in the dark as to who this God is whom 
Professor Paulsen so blithely invokes, whose commands are clear and 
by whom one may easily distinguish believer from nonbeliever. Yes, 
402. RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, PRACTICAL DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS: 
CASES AND CONCEPTS 264 (3d ed. 201 0). 
403. See CATECHISM OF THECA THOLIC CHURCH § 113 (2d ed. 1995). That section reads: 
/d. 
Read the Scripture within "the living Tradition of the whole Church. " 
According to a saying of the Fathers, Sacred Scripture is written 
principally in the Church's heart rather than in documents and records, 
for the Church carries in her Tradition the living memorial of God's 
Word, and it is the Holy Spirit who gives her the spiritual interpretation 
of the Scripture ("according to the spiritual meaning which the Spirit 
grants to the Church"). 
404. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Openness ofTalmud, 41 DuQ. L. REv. 353, 356-57 (2003). 
405. Paulsen, supra note 159, at 1160, 1162, 1183-84. 
406. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Elliott Welsh crossed out the word religious in his application for 
draft exemption and described his opposition to war as founded on 
history and sociology.407 But he also claimed that his views were 
"religious in the ethical sense of that word."408 
Jesus taught, not everyone who calls me Lord will enter the 
Kingdom of Heaven but those who actually do the will of the 
father.409 Karl Barth said to the trade unionists that following Jesus 
"is not a matter of believing in any particular set of ideas, including 
Christian ones, but of actually following him, of building one's life 
on the model of Jesus and relying on a connection to him."4I0 And 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer told us that God was teaching us to get along 
without him.4 II Maybe it was Elliott Welsh who was the faithful 
believer. Who can presume to say otherwise? 
To put this another way, Paulsen invokes a being-like God--{)ne 
who gives rather clear orders that the state sometimes contradicts. 
Many believers, and even many Christians, reject this view of God in 
principle.412 In Seeger, the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich did 
so.4I3 But the Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner does as well: 
"that God really does not exist who operates and functions as an 
individual existent alongside of other existents, and who would then 
as it were be a member of a larger household of all reality.'>4I4 
Instead, God is "the most radical, the most original, and in a certain 
sense the most self-evident reality.'>4Is 
Is it then false to say that God commands obedience? Not at all. 
But as long as the claimant for exemption believes that obedience is 
in fact commanded-that is, that certain behavior is obligatory 
beyond the claimant's own judgment of policy-then all the law can 
say is that this is equivalent to God' commanding this person to act. 
Moral realism in this sense is all the law can require. From the law's 
407. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970). 
408. !d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
409. Matthew 7:21 (King James). 
410. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, HALLOWED SECULARISM: THEORY, BELIEF, PRACTICE 73 (2009). 
411. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, General Teachings/Activities, BIBLICAL DISCERNMENT 
MINISTRIES, http://www.rapidnet.com/-jbeardlbdmlexposes/bonhoeffer/general.htm 
(last modified Mar. 1996). 
412. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 182-83 (1965) (quoting DAVIDS. 
MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION 86-87, 95,98 (1st ed. 1951) (discussing the belief of 
God as a faith-based vision of humanity). 
413. See id. at 180 (quoting 2 PAUL T!LLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: EXISTENCE AND THE 
CHRIST 12 (1957)). 
414. KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IDEA OF 
CHRISTIANITY 63 (William V. Dych trans., 1978). 
415. Id. 
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perspective, the moral realist is religious and her claim to exemption 
is religious. Anyone who disputes this, claiming that only she is 
genuinely religious, is not only arrogant but deluded. 
VIII. Implications of the Pro-Religion Equality Project 
What difference will it make to our national life that many 
nonbelievers might be considered religious from the point of view of 
the Vietnam War draft cases? After all, the burning political/judicial 
religious exemption issues of today are not likely to affect many 
nonbelievers. Today's exemption debates concern matters like 
religious employer coverage of contraception or prohibiting 
discrimination against gays.416 These are not obligations that most 
nonbelievers would seek exclusion from in any event. And even if a 
broad approach to religion were extended to institutions for purposes 
of an analogy to the ministerial exception ratified in Hosanna-Tabor, 
there are few institutions that would fit even the broadened approach 
to religion described above.417 The ACLU and the NRA, for 
example, are still not religious, even under the approach of the 
Vietnam draft cases because the grounds of their positions are 
primarily policy commitments, rather than deep moral claims.418 
I can imagine an organization-let us say a radical environmental 
group that practices a kind of pantheism or panentheism-that would 
come within the Seeger approach to religion, but the truth is that 
government regulation of the employment practices of such a group 
would raise serious free exercise issues already,419 even without 
recourse to Seeger and the other draft cases. 
So the discussion that follows is primarily a matter of a kind of 
identity politics that sometimes plays out in legal settings rather than 
resulting in a change in case outcomes. That is not insignificant, 
however, since some of America's worst political problems root in 
such identity claims. 
If we revisit the debate between McConnell and Feldman, as 
extended by Leiter, we see that the terms of that debate change under 
416. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996); Catholic Charities of the Diocese 
of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d. 459, 461-62 (2006). 
417. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
706 (2012). 
418. See supra text accompanying notes 314-17 (explaining the Court's broadening of the 
Seeger test by its emphasis on the morals and ethics as grounds of religious belief). 
419. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1033 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[U]nder certain 
circumstances, a pantheistic-based philosophy might qualify for protection under the 
[F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause."). 
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the approach of the Vietnam draft cases. It no longer makes sense to 
ask what is special about religious liberty, contrasting religion with 
some non-specified, other realm. Religion and that other realm, 
which Feldman denominated as wisdom or philosophy, but did not 
define,420 and which Leiter refers to as conscience,421 are now 
regarded as overlapping religious commitments. Most such claims 
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause and by any statutory 
religious exemption that is enacted. 
At a certain point in their debate, Feldman insisted that the 
obligation that Antigone felt to bury her brother, in violation of the 
policy of the state, raised a philosophical rather than a religious claim 
and that this demonstrated that religion is not special in terms of 
deserving protection. 422 From the standpoint of the draft cases, 
however, Antigone's commitment is clearly religious and she is 
automatically protected to the same extent as any other religious 
claim of exemption would be. 
So, in all of the current fights in law that revolve around special 
treatment for religion, the Pro-Religion Equality Project treats some 
nonbelievers as if they were religious in a traditional sense. This 
treatment then invites believers and nonbelievers to see the 
commonality of their commitments. This insight will hopefully 
lower the temperature of legal disagreements between believers and 
nonbelievers. 
As I suggested in Part II above, there is an increasing divide today 
in America between believers and nonbelievers.423 I hope that this 
divide is not something inevitable or inherent, but it is something 
real. It is something that we should try to overcome. 
The division that we see need not be fundamental. It might only be 
a matter of political disagreements. One of the reasons that 
nonbelievers are alienated from demands for religious exemptions is 
that they disagree with the political thrust of the claimed 
exemption.424 In other words, many nonbelievers favor gay rights, 
while some religious believers want exemptions from laws banning 
discrimination against gays.425 Supporters of the Vietnam War who 
420. See Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164. 
421. LEITER, supra note 2, at 26. 
422. Feldman & McConnell, supra note 164. 
423. See discussion supra Part II. 
424. See Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 128, at 422-
32. 
425. See Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from Antidiscrimination 
Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who 
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thought that Seeger and Welsh really just opposed the war might 
have felt similarly about religious exemptions. This kind of 
disagreement is at least, in principle, capable of compromise and 
might prove temporary. 
But, the division between believers and nonbelievers might instead 
be much deeper. The more dangerous division occurs when 
nonbelievers see "religious liberty as a protection only for believers," 
as Laycock puts it.426 That kind of division can perhaps be bridged 
by a broader understanding of religion and of religious exemption 
claims. 
My approach to healing this division is to include the beliefs of 
nonbelievers within the rubric of religion. That is how the draft cases 
operate. My approach is quite different from the way others are 
currently thinking about nonbelievers and religious liberty. For 
example, one way people think about this issue is to ask whether 
atheism is itself a religion. Michael McConnell is surely right when 
he argues that the answer to this question must be no, because 
nonbelief by itself does not generate moral obligations.427 The one 
exception to McConnell's observation-one he would accept428-
might be that discrimination against nonbelief itself would be 
unconstitutional, as in a religious oath case such as Torcaso.429 Even 
a negative answer to a religious question, such as whether God exists, 
is religious in the sense of protected by the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses.430 
Nelson Tebbe goes further than McConnell in bringing nortbelief 
and belief together by pointing out that nonbelievers are starting to 
develop more positive approaches to morality and human flourishing 
that generate particular demands on conduct that could come into 
conflict with the demands of the state.431 Tebbe anticipates that 
because of this trend, "it might soon make sense for religious 
Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. 
REv. 173, 176 (20 II); Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEw RESEARCH 
CENTER'S RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT (June 2013), 
http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/slide3.php. 
426. Lacycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 128, at 422. 
427. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. I, 10-11 
(1985); see also Tebbe, supra note 225, at 1156. 
428. McConnell, supra note 427, at 10 ("[E]ach person must be as free to disbelieve as he 
is to believe."). 
429. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961). 
430. See Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 364, at 326 ('"[R]eligion' is any 
set of answers to religious questions, including the negative and skeptical answers of 
atheists, agnostics, and secularists."). 
431. Tebbe, supra note 225, at 1157-58. 
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freedom law to protect practices that are demanded by this form of 
contemporary humanism in much the same way that it protects 
familiar religious observances."432 
But both McConnell and Tebbe are still utilizing terminology that 
distinguishes belief from nonbelief in more than just a sociological or 
self-identifying sense. If, instead of such labeling, we asked what 
nonbelievers actually believe, as Laycock once did for different types 
of religious believers,433 we might find a sense of "transcendent moral 
obligation"434-a sense that what a person does is of infinite 
significance in the universe and that, at least in that sense, persons are 
called to practice a particular way of life. In other words, many 
"believers" and "nonbelievers"-and now I have to use quotation 
marks for these terms-believe the same kinds of things.435 
Up to this point, I have been discussing exclusively Free Exercise 
issues. On the side of the Establishment Clause, the expansion of the 
understanding of what is religious would seem to restrict the reach of 
that clause rather than expanding it.436 But any such conclusion could 
not be accepted. If religion is grounded in the objective reality of 
values, then clearly the government may establish something that 
would be considered religion for purposes of the Free Exercise 
Clause-government may support it, speak in favor of it, and teach it 
in its public schools-without establishing "religion" for purposes of 
the Establishment Clause. That is, government would still be 
permitted to broadly oppose relativism and nihilism under its 
432. /d. at 1158. 
433. Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 364, at 335. 
434. !d. at 336. 
435. Terminology is indeed awkward in this context. How can people be labeled 
nonbelievers when the argument is being made that they have beliefs relevantly 
similar to people traditionally regarded as religious? Maybe the terms should be 
churchgoers and non-churchgoers. 
436. That is, on the assumption that the word religion has the same meaning in the two 
clauses. I reject this position, but the unitary definition approach has an excellent 
pedigree. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting) ('"Religion' appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs 
two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one narrow 
to forbid 'an establishment' and another, much broader, for securing 'the free exercise 
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The majority in Everson did not dispute this aspect of Rutledge's dissent. See id. at 
3-28 (majority opinion). 
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teaching and speaking powers. I have discussed these matters 
elsewhere.437 
Others have previously noted that broad definitions of religion for 
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause lead to a divergence in which 
religion means something different for Establishment Clause 
purposes.438 But this need not be seen as weakening Establishment 
Clause values because discrimination among religions is still 
prohibited. 
To illustrate how the anti-discrimination policy would work in the 
establishment context, consider that if the word God were understood 
along the lines suggested in Seeger, the debate over the permissibility 
of the Pledge of Allegiance and the National Motto would be very 
different. God would then be seen as, among other, more traditional, 
understandings, the God above the God of theism rather than as only 
a supernatural being separate from the natural world. With that broad 
understanding, it would no longer be necessary to "disregard" 
polytheists and even some monotheists, as Justice Scalia felt 
compelled to do in McCreary County,439 in order to uphold these 
public acknowledgments of God. Such persons would not 
necessarily be excluded from belief in such a broadened God 
concept. 
A broader understanding of religion would also have the effect of 
opening up the curriculum of the public schools. Not only could and 
should such schools offer a curriculum in the formation of objective 
values, but such a curriculum should expose students to a variety of 
viewpoints now regarded as "religious" and therefore out of bounds. 
It should be remembered that as part of the opening up of religion 
that led to Seeger, the Court in Torcaso v. Watkins in 1961, which 
invalidated a Maryland requirement of a belief in God to hold public 
office, had already defined "secular humanism" as a nontheistic 
religion.440 And, as Douglas Laycock reminds us, the first Humanist 
437. See LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM, supra note 
235, at 99, 118. 
438. See Steven D. Collier, Comment, Beyond Seeger!Welsh: Redefining Religion Under 
the Constitution, 31 Emory L.J. 973,991 (1982) ("A second major weakness of the 
Seeger/Welsh definition is that ... a different definition apparently is required for the 
Establishment Clause .... "). 
439. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("With 
respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our 
Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of 
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of 
devout atheists."). 
440. 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll, 496 ( 1961 ). 
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Manifesto also presented humanism as a new religion.441 Insofar as 
that is the case, however, the result should not be to restrict the 
teaching of humanism in the public schools, but to recognize when 
humanism is being taught and to ensure that many points of view are 
presented, including theistic ones. Currently, as many believers 
object, such humanism is taught sub rosa, while efforts to engage that 
worldview are excluded as religious. 
This approach does not change everything-it does not support 
challenges to the teaching of evolution, for example. Evolution in 
and of itself is not religion even under an expanded defmition. The 
fact that evolutionary theory may have the effect of discrediting some 
interpretations of Genesis does not render the theory itself religious. 
On the other hand, evolution can be taught, and sometimes is, as 
support for what Charles Taylor calls "exclusive humanism."442 If 
that is done, then the school is teaching a religion when it presents 
such a perspective and must either stop doing so or must expand its 
offerings to allow challenges to that worldview. 
Aside from the effect for law of an expansive approach to religion, 
what will happen politically and culturally if the religious and the 
secular come to be understood differently from the way we tend to 
understand them now? What would it mean for this society to see the 
common ground between religious belief and some forms of what we 
have regarded heretofore as nonbelief? 
Once the common ground between believers and nonbelievers is 
seen in a way that penetrates the culture, the divide between believers 
and nonbelievers may recede. Once nonbelievers begin to ask what it 
means to feel the weight of infinite significance, they may stop 
speaking of "rationality" as the basis of life and they may cease to 
regard believers as merely superstitious. It may even occur to 
nonbelievers that words like God might include and describe many of 
their own commitments. Once believers accept the moral realism of 
non-churchgoers, they may reduce their insistence that atheism leads 
to immorality. This is what I mean by the suggestion that the draft 
cases can heal our culture war divisions. 
There are a number of hints that this kind of recognition may be 
occurring. One obvious example is the new book by New York 
Times columnist Ross Douthat, Bad Religion: How We Became a 
Nation of Heretics,443 which argues that America is not a secular 
441. Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 364, at 328. 
442. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 18-19 (2007). 
443. Ross DOUTHAT, BAD RELIGION: How WE BECAME A NATION OF HERETICS (2012). 
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country, but is instead still a Christian country but one with 
increasingly unorthodox doctrines.444 Douthat's analysis can help us 
understand how so many persons not affiliated with religion can tell 
pollsters that they believe in God and how so many persons who say 
they do not believe in God believe in other forms of supernaturalism, 
like angels.445 In another example, without specifically mentioning 
Douthat's book, Kate Blanchard and Rachel Ozanne recently-in 
May, 2012-discussed the heretic versus atheist terminology in terms 
of their own beliefs in the online magazine Religion Dispatches.446 
Their discussion thoroughly dissolves any easy reference to belief 
and nonbelief. 
A somewhat earlier example, and one I have written about 
before,447 is Andre Comte-Sponville's book, The Little Book of 
Atheist Spirituality.448 Comte-Sponville, though an atheist, prays 
because, quoting Simone Weil, "'Love and prayer are merely the 
highest form of attention. "'449 There is no reason to distinguish 
Comte-Sponville's beliefs from those of many believers and he freely 
acknowledges his debt to the Christian tradition. 
Another book published in spring 2012, Alain de Botton's Religion 
for Atheists,450 also seeks a closer connection for nonbelievers to the 
religious traditions. David Brooks wrote of de Botton that he "looks 
around and sees a secular society denuded of high spiritual aspiration 
and practical moral guidance.'"'51 The traditional religions knew how 
to elevate human life, a wisdom we nonbelievers increasingly lack. 
Brooks makes fun of de Botton's suggestion of a quarterly Day of 
444. !d. at 4. 
445. See id. 
446. Kate Blanchard, Coming Out as a Heretic, RELIGION DISPATCHES (May 10, 2012), 
http://www .religiondispatches.org/archive/atheologies/5941 /coming_out_as_a_heretic 
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Atonement in a secular society,452 but that may be just the kind of 
practical ceremonialism that nonbelievers need. 
Another recent example of a closer connection between believers 
and nonbelievers is a short essay by the well-known atheist Austin 
Dacey in which he discusses the law of blasphemy related to his 
book, The Future of Blasphemy.453 Dacey makes the point that there 
is symmetry between the commitments of the believer and those of 
the nonbeliever: 
From a moral perspective, there is an important 
symmetry between the attitude of the believer who 
reserves special reverence for a deity, saint, or 
prophet, and the attitude of the secularist who asserts 
that every person is equally holy. Neither of these 
beliefs is uniquely deserving of being labeled a 
spiritual commitment, relegating the other to mere 
"'speech" against that commitment.454 
While Dacey is arguing a different point from mine here-Dacey is 
arguing that atheists deserve protection as much as do religious 
believers455-his premise is my thesis: that persons who do not 
believe in God still dwell in a world, still speak the language, still 
make commitments to and still are in relationship with, the sacred. 
But probably the most significant example of movement of 
nonbelievers into the neighborhood of religion is that of the late legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin. In August, 2013, some months after 
his death in February, Harvard University Press published his last 
book, Religion Without God.456 I have not yet read this book, but I 
was able to read the first chapter, which was excerpted some months 
before in the New York Review of Books.457 Here Dworkin attempts 
to delineate a religious viewpoint without invoking the 
452. /d. 
453. Austin Dacey, Sacrilege, in THE FUTURE OF BLASPHEMY: SPEAKING OF THE SACRED IN 
AN AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (20 12). 
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supernatural.458 The result is very much along the lines set forth in 
this article. The religious attitude insists that values are real and 
fundamental-as real, says Dworkin, as trees or pain.459 The 
religious attitude does rest on faith, as Leiter says, but so do science 
and mathematics, according to Dworkin.460 
At this point I have to ask, what is the problem? Why are we 
divided? Once believers are seen as nonbelievers and nonbelievers as 
believers, it will be easier for us to talk with each other. But this 
recognition places a burden on persons not affiliated with traditional 
religion. For, whereas many traditional believers really are willing to 
admit that they are not genuinely believers-that is just akin to 
admitting that we are all sinners-we secularists have been unwilling 
to press our beliefs beyond insipid cliches about rationality. We 
"nonbelievers" must begin to ask what it is we believe and affirm. In 
a general sense, we affirm significance, objectivity and meaning. But 
we have not yet made these general commitments definite. Insofar as 
the Vietnam draft cases are willing to grant religious exemption to a 
belief that "occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that 
filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for 
the exemption,"461 we now must begin to ask in a serious way, what 
kind of nontheistic, nonreligious belief is parallel to a belief in the 
orthodox God? In the sense that we secularists have never sought to 
clarify our beliefs in a fundamental way, we have not yet really 
begun to be secular. 
IX. CONCLUSION: WE HAVE NEVER BEEN SECULAR 
I write this conclusion with obvious apologies to Bruno Latour's 
book, We Have Never Been Modern. 462 Latour's point is that, for all 
our vaunted modernity, in a sense we have never been modern in our 
sensibilities or comportment.463 Well, we have never been secular 
either. 
We have never been secular in two senses. On the one hand, we 
live under the great shadow of the Christian experience. The 
emptiness of our nonbelief has the shape of the traditional God, 
which is why the New Atheists had no trouble attacking the concept 
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this culture retains so much supernaturalism-vampire chronicles,464 
God as the Chairman in the movie, The Adjustment Bureau,465 The 
One in the Matrix movies,466 and so forth. Of course, we also retain 
the notion of enlightened humanism that we received from the 
medieval Church. 
But there is another sense in which we have never been secular. 
Our secularism has manifested largely in an absence of religion. If 
we ask for the positive meaning of secularism, or its foundations, we 
get vagueness and indeterminacy. I have recently examined the 
potential for meaning in the Establishment Clause context,467 and the 
same is true here in the context of religious exemptions and the Free 
Exercise Clause. There is a need for explicit affirmation of the 
grounds of meaning that are available in a secular world. 
The goal for secularism must be to be fully secular in both these 
senses. Insofar as we borrow from Christianity, we should do so 
consciously, so that we are not carrying forward habits we should be 
breaking. In that way, we would not simply be living in the shadow 
of the Church. 
But we need to act consciously in all regards, not just in rejecting 
the concept of the supernatural Creator God. We need to consciously 
build a positive secular civilization. We who are not traditionally 
religious need to commit to a meaningful way of life that is just as 
exacting as are the demands of organized religion. 
If we do this, I believe that secular civilization will not end up in 
conflict with the Christian civilization that Pope Benedict had been 
encouraging the Church to reinvigorate before he stepped down.468 It 
is false to think that there is much in Christian tradition that 
secularism needs to reject. The antagonism that has been manifest is 
either merely political-antagonism to certain political positions held 
by some religious believers, but of course not by others-or is the 
result of ignorance of the positive inheritance we receive from the 
Church. The liberal tradition and the scientific tradition are either 
464. I ANNE RICE, THE VAMPIRE CHRONICLES COLLECTION (2002). 
465. See THE ADJUSTMENT BUREAU (Universal Pictures 20 II). 
466. See THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999); THE MATRIX RELOADED (Warner Bros. 2003); 
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KENT L. REv. 725 (2012). 
468. See David Kerr, Pope Challenges US Bishops to Revive Christian Culture, CATHOLIC 
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http://www .catholicnewsagency .com/news/pope-challenges-us-bishops-to-revive-
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direct achievements of Christianity or, if that is too strong, at least its 
achievement in large part. 
These considerations arise in the Free Exercise context as we ask 
the question from Seeger about a belief that occupies a place parallel 
to the orthodox belief in God.469 I only intend in this paper to 
tentatively suggest some directions in which that question can lead 
secularists. 
First, God is binding. God is not experienced as a choice. This is 
why Paulsen argues that only monotheists are protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause-because God really does "make commands of 
loyalty and obedience that constrain human behavior."470 Laycock 
understands this, which is why he points to the role that natural law 
could play in the life of the religiously nonaffiliated.471 The 
foundations of such bindingness, however, in the absence of God, are 
obviously in question. Nevertheless, as C.S. Lewis explained, the 
most important commitment that the various wisdom traditions share 
is not to God, but to the worldview that humans are a certain kind of 
being and that the universe is a certain kind of thing to which we 
must conform.472 And this must be true not just in terms of policies, 
but of personal morality-away from what David Brooks calls our 
current moral "mediocrity."473 
Second, and following that sense of obligation, there must be a 
sense of consequence. This sense of consequence is known in 
monotheism as God's judgment.474 I have not understood the strange 
apathy about global warming in policy debate. Earlier generations 
would have intuited God's judgment in the warming climate that 
threatens human life, judgment for the greed that creates an economic 
system that sacrifices the needs of the poor, and of most people, and 
that ignores responsibility for God's good creation. Global warming 
has the perfect shape of Biblical prophecy-if you do not do God's 
will, the rains will not fall. Where is this witness today? Secularism 
must be able to affirm that there are consequences for the failure to 
obey the restrictions reality puts on us. Our out of control economic 
development and globalization are simply the Tower of Babel. 
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Third, God is a style. It is not an accident that all religions have 
their ceremonies, holidays, rites and rituals. These all help form a 
religious way of life. But what is the secular way of life? Even if 
there are many possible forms of secular life, it must still be the case 
that there are meaningful non-rational elements of beauty in secular 
living. The plaintiffs in the Vietnam draft cases raised ethical issues 
out of lives of meditative thoughtfulness.475 That certainly is a kind 
of style. But secularists in general have not been interested in how 
secularists will actually live, beyond coming up with substitutes for 
Christmas for the children of secularist parents. 
Fourth, God is in community. Yes, the Supreme Court has held 
that membership in a religious group is not a requirement for raising 
a claim of religious exemption.476 However, our concern here is not 
law; our concern is secularism as a way of life. While a way of life 
can be singular and idiosyncratic, at some point there must be a 
reference to a community. In addition, the traditional religions have 
a sense that the demands of the group have something to do with the 
happiness and flourishing of humanity as a whole. That is another 
aspect of community ignored by secularism up to this point 
Finally, for purposes of this brief summary, God is comprehensive. 
In the monotheistic traditions, there is not a separation between 
personal morality and politics. These are all one. For example, 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have long histories of teachings on 
both ceremonialism and spiritual practices on the one hand, and 
political life and economic organization on the other. The Vietnam 
draft cases tended to forget this and asked only about beliefs 
concerning war. But one belief by itself simply cannot be parallel to 
the place of God in the life of the believer. 
With this understanding of what it means to be religious, are we in 
fact all religious? The answer is actually both yes and no for people 
who call themselves religious and for people who call themselves 
nonbelievers. There is a lot of functional atheism in the world and 
much of it occurs in churches. 
So, those people who see reality as an accident and human life as 
meaningless are not truly religious in the sense of having beliefs 
parallel to the orthodox belief in God. This is also true of anyone 
who puts his own interests above those of others and of the planet. 
Some of those people go to church quite regularly while others do 
not. 
475. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-38 (1970). 
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On the other hand, we who see reality as binding, consequential, 
beautiful, communal, and comprehensive and who try to live out of 
that understanding really are religious. Most of us, though like the 
sinners we are, generally fail. Believers are not any better off in this 
context than nonbelievers. 
